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ABSTRACT
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History

Damming Paradise: Public Power, Free Enterprise, and Tribal Sovereignty in the Mountain West
in the Twentieth Century
Chair: Tobin Miller-Shearer
“Damming Paradise” examines the transformation of the political economy of the Mountain
West through the development of hydropower over the course of the twentieth century.
Beginning with early attempts to regulate electricity marketing and dam construction, this thesis
traces the development of a conservation paradigm which insisted upon full development of
water resources and public ownership of hydropower facilities. The author then follows that
development through the New Deal and Post War eras, focusing particular attention on the Kerr
Dam (now Seli’š Ksanka Qlispe’ Dam) and Hungry Horse Dam on Montana’s Flathead River.
“Damming Paradise” then examines the attempt to expand public power marketing through river
valley authorities in 1944-50, demonstrating how a coalition of business interests and
preservationists defeated those proposals and sowed doubt about the economic and ecological
costs of federal hydropower. Finally, this thesis hones in on competing plans for damming the
Lower Flathead River in the 1950s and 1960s. Throughout the thesis, the author examines the
actions of various members of the Confederated Tribes of the Flathead Reservation and the
development of tribal sovereignty in relation to natural resource management.
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Introduction

In a 1958 address to the Montana Farmer Labor Institute in Missoula, Montana, Special Counsel
to the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Milton C. Mapes called upon the legacy of
Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot to argue for the construction of a dam on the Clark Fork River.
Mapes’ argument for damming the Clark Fork at Paradise, Montana, was premised upon the former
president’s assertion that a civilized nation is one which utilizes its soil, water, and forest resources such
that “the nation will have their benefit in the future.” Given that starting point, Mapes asked his audience:
“Can a nation that permits half development of one of its greatest power sites call itself civilized under
Teddy Roosevelt’s definition?”1 Throughout his lengthy address, the Senate Counselor continued to refer
back to speeches given by Pinchot and Roosevelt as if citing chapter and verse from the conservation
bible. For Mapes, the fifty years that had passed between Roosevelt’s presidency and his speech served
only to heighten the importance of building large federal dams to fully utilize water resources, to harness
labor saving electricity, to reclaim wasted land, and to extirpate the greedy private interests that
threatened those conservation goals.
Mapes was not the only one who turned to Roosevelt and Pinchot when considering the future of
the Clark Fork River. Eight years earlier in 1950, Montana Grange Master and nature writer Winton
Weydemeyer warned his fellow conservationists against following the examples of Roosevelt and Pinchot
too literally, writing: “Perhaps because a necessary foundation in resource conservation in America was

Milton C. Mapes, “Wise Conservation and Utilization of Our Resources: Key to Freedom’s Survival,” Address to
the Montana Farmer Labor Institute, November 22, 1958, pamphlet distributed by Committee for Paradise Dam, in
John R. Garber Papers (JRG), box 1, folder 7, p. 2-3.
1
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laid by Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot… we conservationists through the years have
overemphasized the role of public ownership or control of natural resources.” Weydemeyer was
concerned that if conservationists persisted with top-down schemes and continued to lend their support to
federal hydropower projects, they would fail to achieve true conservation, lending their credibility to the
destructive forces of overdevelopment in the process. While still allowing that there was some role for the
federal government to play in managing things like the National Parks and the National Forests, he
endorsed a system primarily based on local control and private initiative. He asked rhetorically, “Can
conservation best be accomplished by government planners or by the people?”2 While Mapes argued that
the government and the people were one and the same, Weydemeyer saw the two as opposing factions,
insisting that federal planners could never understand the complexity of the diverse social and ecological
landscape.
Debates over the meaning of conservation were steeped in theoretical musings about democracy
and human nature, but the stakes were quite tangible. Both sides hoped to reshape the rivers of the West
according to their understanding of what was best for the people. For Mapes and the public power lobby,
that meant the construction of large federal hydropower dams. For Weydemeyer and the free enterprise
conservationists, that meant the construction of hundreds of relatively small dams and canals planned and
maintained by local organizations within each creek and river valley. While neither plan was executed in
its entirety, the struggle between the two shaped the political and economic development of the Western
United States in the twentieth century. In Mapes and Weydemeyer can be seen but two examples of the
positions taken throughout the near century long debate over the development of water power in the West
and in the Clark Fork Basin specifically. In addition to their opposing visions of conservation there were
the interests of private electricity companies and the varied interests of those who lived along the River—
particularly Native American communities such as the members of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes of the Flathead Reservation.

Winton Weydemeyer, “The CVA and Conservation: Open letter to The Editors, Nature Magazine,” January 7,
1950, Winton Weydemeyer Papers (WWP), box 3, folder 4.
2
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This is a history of the rise and fall of public power development in the Western United States,
from the initial attempts by progressive era politicians to reign in the power monopoly, to the New Deal’s
triumphant dam building, to the resurgence of private electricity interests in the 1950s, the preservationist
moment of the 1960s, and the energy crisis of the 1970s. “Damming Paradise” examines several dam
proposals on the Clark Fork and Flathead Rivers in Montana in order to understand the political
transformation of the American West between 1932 and 1970. Whether or not to build a dam at Paradise,
Montana, became a referendum on public control of the energy grid, the sovereignty of Native American
tribes, the environmental impact of New Deal policies, and the future of the West. By looking at the
debate over public power in the mid twentieth century, this thesis traces the triumph and subsequent
decline of New Deal governance, the resurgence of free market thinking and the political power of
investor-owned utilities, along with the development of tribal sovereignty in the wake of allotment,
relocation, and termination.

Dams have long been a focus of historians of the American West. As the “working
pyramids” of the United States, large federal dams are a potent symbol of engineering might and
collective will.3 They are the temples of the American Empire in the West.4 As water storage,
flood control, navigation, and hydropower projects, large dams and the federal appropriations for
their construction have greased the wheels of political deals throughout the 20th century. 5 As
disruptors of fish migration, inundating ancestral lands behind their huge, unnatural concrete

The phrase “working pyramid” likely originates with Carl, a worker on the Grand Coulee Dam who used the
phrase to describe the project in a conversation with historian Murray Morgan; Murray Morgan, The Dam (New
York: Viking Press, 1954), xviii; Nicholas J. Schnitter, A History of Dams: the Useful Pyramids, (New York: Taylor
and Francis, 1994) xii, 4-21; Interestingly, Sierra Club President David Brower and radical environmentalist Edward
Abbey both use the Pyramid metaphor for America’s dams as well, however these two liked to imagine the ruins of
abandoned dams as the only remaining evidence of a lost culture that had the hubris to construct them; David
Brower “Let the River Run Through it” Sierra Magazine, (March/April 1997), accessed via Sierra Club Vault
https://vault.sierraclub.org/sierra/199703/brower.asp; Edward Abbey, Desert Solitaire, (Random House: New York,
1968), 160.
4
Mark Reisner, Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its Disappearing Water, (New York: Penguin Books,
1993), 104.
5
Reisner, 7; Donald Worster, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American West, (New York:
Random House, 1985), 130.
3

3

facades they have been derided as the embodiment of the United States’ capacity for hubris,
cruelty, and devastation.6 Photos of dams decorate the walls of union halls in the Northwest, and
hopeful paintings of their destruction hang in the offices of environmental nonprofits.7 This
chapter contributes to each of those traditions by reflecting upon a great concrete monolith (even
an imagined one) as a lens through which to understand the politics, economy, and environment
of a particular place and time.
The first histories of Western hydropower development were triumphal narratives of
nature conquered by engineering know-how and manly might. Among the best of these is
Murray Morgan’s The Dam. Written in 1954, The Dam depicts the grandeur of the Columbia
River primarily to emphasize the monumental task of controlling its flow and making it “useful.”
The Dam was written to inspire his audience to reflect on just how much life had changed in the
Pacific Northwest since Coulee started sending lightning through its wires in 1941. Morgan
opens his history of Grand Coulee with an anecdote from his time as a student at the University
of Washington back in 1935 when a classmate told him that he was dropping out of school to
work on the dam, not for money but to be part of something important. “If our generation has
anything to offer history, it's that dam,” the student proclaimed.8 While The Dam is filled with
human stories of all sorts and Morgan does address conflict between various interests in the
Columbia Basin and briefly touches on the devastating effect that Grand Coulee Dam had on the

Abbey, 181–82; in “A Prayer for Salmon’s Second Coming” David James Duncan blames “spiritually inert”
“slackwater politicians” for damming the Snake River, David J. Duncan My Story As Told By Water, (Oakland, CA:
University of California Press, 2002) 181–214; numerous Native American Authors have written about the impact
of dams on their land and culture, some examples are D’Arcy McNickle Wind from an Enemy Sky, (Albuquerque,
NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1988); and Sherman Alexi “The Powwow at the End of the World” in The
Summer of Black Widows (New York: Hanging Loose Press, 1996).
7
These images refer specifically to the IUOE Union Hall in Spokane, WA, which is decorated with photographs of
each of the Columbia and Snake River Dams and the Save Our Wild Salmon office also in Spokane, WA, which
displays the painting “Resurrection” by Monte Dolack commissioned by Idaho Rivers United depicting the
destruction of Lower Granite Dam on the Snake River.
8
Morgan, xviii.
6
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Native people, the arc of his narrative always returns to spirited cooperation, human ingenuity,
and technological progress.9
Mid twentieth century historians continued to write occasionally about dams and power
development, with a decidedly more political approach. Elmo Richardson, who has been
considered the preeminent historian of natural resource policy in the Truman and Eisenhower
administrations, began to blend political history with a growing interest in ecological
conservation. Richardson focused on the dual purpose of the Interior Department in the West as
both guardians of nature and developers of water and mineral resources and how the sometimes
irreconcilable conflict between those two functions produced post-war environmental policy.10
One of Richardson’s greatest contributions to the history of hydropower was his identification of
a marked shift in natural resource policy during the Eisenhower administration, particularly with
the appointment of Douglas “Giveaway” McKay as Interior Secretary.11
In the 1980s, the environmental turn in American History and the public reckoning with
the impact of dams led to a complete tonal shift in how the history of hydropower was written.
Two books from that era have become indispensable texts in any study of Western water. These
two books—Marc Reisner’s Cadillac Desert and Donald Worster’s Rivers of Empire—both lay
out the history of Western water development on a long timeline presenting the story of a thirsty
nation forcing a dry land into total submission in the reckless pursuit of wealth and power. 12

9

See Morgan, 32–34, 71–76.
Elmo Richardson, Dams, Parks, and Politics: Resource Development and Preservation in the Truman Eisenhower
Era (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1973); Praise for Richardson found in Karl Boyd Brooks, Public
Power Private Dams, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), 184.
11
Elmo Richardson, “The Interior Secretary as Conservation Villain: The Notorious Case of Douglas ‘Giveaway’
McKay,” Pacific Historical Review 41, no. 3 (August 1972), 333–45; That turn in federal policy is explored in
Chapter Two: “Democracy in Retreat.”
12
Other environmental histories of dams also came out of the 1980s, in particular two books about damming the
Colorado River, Russel Martin, A Story That Stands Like A Dam: Glen Canyon and the Struggle for the Soul of the
West, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1989); and Philip L. Fradkin, A River No More: The Colorado River
and the West, (New York: Knopf, 1981).
10
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Reisner’s more journalistic work recounts in thrilling detail how William Mulholland lied and
cheated to secure water for Los Angeles at the turn of the century, how Reclamation
Commissioner Floyd Dominy manipulated Congress and battled the Sierra Club in the 1960s,
and how incompetent federal bureaucrats failed to stop the Teton Dam collapse in 1972. With
each of the dozens of vignettes from the history of Western water development that Reisner
relates, he paints a picture of a nation unwilling to accept the harsh reality of the West’s aridity.
For Reisner, that misunderstanding of the West coupled with the self-interest of those bold and
deluded enough to presume that they could make the desert bloom leads him to two primary
conclusions. First, Reisner concludes that federal water projects have been shaped by interagency
competition—especially between the Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of
Reclamation—and pork barrel politics in Congress. Second, he argues that this process is leading
toward an inevitable collapse. By highlighting the Teton Dam disaster, the rapid depletion of the
Ogallala Aquifer, and the outlandish NAWAPA project, he argues that the age of dams is over—
or at least it ought to be, if the West is to have a future at all.
While Reisner highlighted the dysfunction and mismanagement of western water
development by the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers, Donald Worster
emphasized the throughline of a singular, profit motivated imperial project. In Rivers of Empire,
the historian depicts the development of a rigidly hierarchical hydraulic society in the West in
which the challenges presented by the environment have led to the centralization of power in a
capitalist state manipulated by various local elites.13 Even when water development was
championed in the name of democracy and progress, Worster argues that these claims were
deluded or deceptive, claiming that “In the West, the single most important function of that state

This is perhaps an oversimplification of Worster’s more complex argument about the hydraulic society and the
capitalist state, which is most succinctly described in Rivers of Empire, 279–285.
13
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has been… making abundant what was scarce, putting an elusive, stingy nature within private
reach where before it was unattainable”14 Like Reisner, Worster also presents a declensionist
narrative with an intense conviction writing, “nothing is more certain in the modern West than
that the next stage after empire will be decline.”15
Both of these western water histories came at a time when the nation was beginning to
understand the scale of environmental destruction that had been wrought by the nation’s dam
building craze. As such, the authors trained their sights upon the causes of that era and its
environmental consequences. They brought a much needed indictment against dams with the
rhetorical force of Old Testament prophets that has had noticeable effect.16 Although the
conclusions about the motives of dam builders and what brought the dam building era to a close
presented here differ from those presented by Reisner and Worster forty years earlier, both books
have shaped “Damming Paradise.” As in Cadillac Desert, “Damming Paradise” also points to
competition between dam builders to explain the existing hydropower systems of the West.
However, unlike Reisner’s narrative of interagency conflict, “Damming Paradise” argues that
conflict between public and private power utilities and between ad hoc development and
coordinated valley authorities determined the fate of the Flathead and Clark Fork Rivers. While
Cadillac Desert gives vivid detail to federal mismanagement and inter-agency squabbling, the
significant role played by private electricity utilities is decidedly absent from Reisner’s narrative.
While taking account of the empire building of the capitalist state described by Worster,
“Damming Paradise” attempts to humanize dam advocates who have at times alternately
appeared as either villains or fools. This thesis sheds light on their hydro-social vision without

14

Ibid., 284.
Worster, 261.
16
See Lawrie Mott, “Postscript to the Revised Edition” in Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert: The American West and
its Disappearing Water, (New York: Penguin Books, 2017), 521–66.
15
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denying, excusing, or covering up their environmental footprints. While Reisner and especially
Worster were not ignorant of ambitious progressive plans like the Columbia Valley
Administration or the lobbying of private electricity companies against those schemes, both
authors’ preoccupation with impending collapse limited the degree to which they took those
dynamics seriously. This thesis puts declensionist speculation aside and focuses instead on the
contingent happenings, the dams that almost were and the struggles over management of those
that came to be.
In recent decades scholars have introduced more nuance, resurrected forgotten economic
and political dynamics, and given voice to those who have been silenced by previous accounts of
western water development—particularly Native Americans. The footprints of federal dams and
federal environmental policy generally are not merely on the landscape, but on its first
inhabitants. Native Americans have been subject to federal experiments in resource management,
from flooding land and clear cutting forests, to designating large swaths of their unceded
territory as roadless wilderness.17 Each of the historians cited above made some mention of the
impact of dams on Native Americans, but the first full account of how river development
uniquely targeted Native people was Michael Lawson’s book Dammed Indians in 1982.18
Historians since Lawson have followed suit, bringing Native American voices forward in the
history of natural resource management. Tribe members themselves began to document their
struggles with the hydropower system in films such as As Long as the Rivers Run, and The Place

17

Garrit Voggesser, Irrigation, Timber, and Hydropower: Negotiating Natural Resource Development on the
Flathead Indian Reservation, Montana, 1904–1945, with a Preface by Robert Bigart, (Salish-Kootenai College
Press, Pablo, MT: 2017) 59–88; Paul Sutter, Driven Wild (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2002),
227–230.
18
Michael Lawson, Dammed Indians: The Pick-Sloan Plan and the Missouri River Sioux, 1944–1980, (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1994).
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of Falling Waters.19 A recent dissertation entitled “Worth A Dam” Shawn P. Bailey places the
Paradise Dam proposal of the 1940s within the narrative of Native American resistance to
dispossession. Bailey recounts how some members of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes of the Flathead Reservation (CSKT) helped fight for a dam in Glacier National Park in
order to prevent a different dam from flooding the Flathead Reservation.20 Garrit Voggesser has
also written a detailed account of the conflicts between CSKT and the Flathead Irrigation
Project, the Northern Pacific Railroad, and the Montana Power Company in his 2004 dissertation
that became a 2017 book. “Damming Paradise'' benefits from this recent scholarship and
contributes to Native American history by highlighting the Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes’ struggle for sovereignty over their forests and damsites in 1956–65. This thesis
challenges both the myth of the “Ecological Indian” and the narrative of victimization without
resistance by focusing on the economic ambitions that CSKT leaders had for their natural
resources and the political action that they took to secure their access to those resources. 21
Very little has been written about the Paradise Dam proposals, despite the wealth of
primary source evidence attesting to their importance.22 Sean P. Bailey’s research on the Glacier
View and Paradise Dams thus resurrected a nearly forgotten chapter in the history of
hydropower. Bailey’s analysis of the Glacier View saga is sharp and by juxtaposing the project
with the Paradise Dam he highlights the constrained choices that faced the CSKT. Yet while
Bailey lays out a detailed history of both Glacier View and Paradise, giving due credit for their

19

As Long as the Rivers Run, directed by Carol Burns and Hank Adams, restored and distributed by Salmon Defense
(Olympia, WA: Survival of American Indians Association, 1971); The Place of Falling Waters, directed by Roy
Bigcrane and Thompson Smith (Pablo, MT: Salish-Kootenai College Media Center, 1990).
20
Shawn P. Bailey, "Worth a Dam: Glacier View and The Preservation of Wild America" (PhD diss. University of
Montana, 2020).
21
For the myth of the ecological Indian see Shepard Krech III, The Ecological Indian: Myth and History, (New
York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1999).
22
Elmo Richardson did briefly address Glacier View, but made no mention of Paradise, see Dams, Parks, and
Politics, 108–09, 197.
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defeat to the wilderness movement and the CSKT respectively, he overlooks the role that the
Montana Power Company played in that history. This thesis does not delve too deeply into the
Glacier View Dam proposal, focusing instead on the efforts of public power advocates like Mike
Mansfield, James Murray, and Lee Metcalf toward greater public control of the energy market.
Their vision for Montana and the West was to escape the extractive, colonial economics of the
past through federal hydropower production. That vision—while successful in isolated places
such as Columbia Falls, Montana—was defeated by the concerted efforts of private electricity
companies and their allies in the extractive industries such as timber and mining. While
preservation interests eventually succeeded at protecting wild rivers throughout the West, they
were only able to do so because of how private power had weakened public power in the Post
War era. By recentering the Paradise Dam fight around control of the energy grid, “Damming
Paradise” also complicates the narrative of Native American sovereignty, as CSKT leaders were
split over the idea of damming the Flathead River within their borders as discussed in Chapter
Three.
As a work of political history, this thesis picks up on recent historiographic trends
regarding the rise of the American right and the decline of the New Deal order. In
“Environmental Law and the End of the New Deal Order,” Paul Sabin argues that the
enforcement of the Wilderness Act of 1964, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1970, and the Endangered Species Acts of 1966 and 1973,
gave rise to anti-state, yet pro-regulation politics that saw the expansion of federal power as both
a threat to the environment and a necessary tool for its protection.23 According to Sabin, a group

23

Paul Sabin, "Environmental Law and the End of the New Deal Order," Law and History Review 33, no. 4 (2015):
965-1003; Sabin further examines the role that environmentalism played in undoing the New Deal and Great Society
in Paul Sabin, Public Citizens: The Attack on Big Government and the Remaking of American Liberalism, (New
York: Norton, 2021).
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of public interest lawyers utilized Great Society environmental laws to strengthen the
government’s capacity to enforce protections for wild rivers and endangered animals, while
opposing that same government when it sought to construct interstate highways and towering
dams, creating a new class of lawyers and professionals who were loyal to the Democratic Party
but hostile to the public works programs of the New Deal. That development is highlighted in
Chapter Three, as wilderness advocates such as David Brower were split between their moral
commitment to free-flowing rivers and their pragmatic commitment to the Democratic Party.
Chapter Two sheds light on the potential that existed for environmental politics to align with
progressive social goals in the CIO’s Magnificent Columbia version of the CVA proposal.
Chapter Two also shows how a coalition of business interests hostile to the New Deal challenged
the economic reasoning and engineering wisdom of federal power planners, adding an
environmental dimension to the narrative laid out by Kim Phillips-Fein in Invisible Hands and
Lawrence Glickman in Free Enterprise.24 Calling attention to the politicization of the
environment in the 1950s, this thesis also benefits from the work of Brian A. Drake in Loving
Nature, Fearing the State.25
While the history of dams has tended to flatten the distinctions between federal
hydropower developers and investor-owned utilities, a notable exception is Public Power,
Private Dams by Ken Boyd Brooks. Brooks’ telling of the Hells Canyon High Dam controversy
in western Idaho focuses on the conflict between the Bonneville Power Administration and the
Idaho Power Company, while also paying some attention to the salmon crisis. Through the Hells
Canyon saga he illuminates the simultaneous rise of free market economics and environmental

24

Kim Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: The Businessmen's Crusade Against the New Deal, (New York: Norton,
2010); Lawrence Glickman, Free Enterprise: An American History, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019).
25
Brian Alan Drake, Loving Nature Fearing the State: Environmentalism and Antigovernment Politics before
Reagan, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2013).
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protection in the 1950s and 60s. The parallels between the Hells Canyon High Dam and the
Paradise Dam are not just evident to historians today, they were quite clear to Paradise Dam
advocates, including John F. Kennedy.26 Brooks describes the Northwest power landscape in
military terms, referring to the attempt by public power advocates to annex southern Idaho into
the public power territory of the BPA. Using the same territorial understanding of electrical
governance, western Montana was also a new frontier for public power. If Hungry Horse Dam
was a beachhead in Montana Power’s territory, Paradise Dam would have constituted a full-scale
invasion. By centering the conflict between public and private electricity development like
Brooks did in Public Power, Private Dams, “Damming Paradise” concludes that the lobbying
efforts of investor-owned utilities shaped the development of the Post War political economy in
the Mountain West.
In order to understand the motivations of both public and private power interests and their
impact on the political economy of the Mountain West, I have focused primarily on the state of
Montana and the Clark Fork and Flathead Rivers. Every river is unique, and conclusions about a
broad and diverse region based on any single watershed will have their limits. However, as
Montana straddles the continental divide, holding the headwaters of two of the two of the great
western river systems and encompassing a variety of climates and landscapes, the state serves as
a microcosm of the region. The political leadership of Montana has been at the forefront of much
of what is discussed in this thesis, as Senators James Murray, Mike Mansfield, Burton Wheeler,
and Lee Metcalf all played major roles in the regulation of electricity, development of natural
resources, relations with Indian tribes, and the preservation of wilderness. In addition to the
political leadership, Montana is also home to the Anaconda Mining Company and its affiliated

Kennedy campaign speech in Billings, MT September 22, 1960, quoted in “Montana Needs Knowles” Committee
for Paradise Dam, 1961, JRG, box 1, folder 7.
26
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Montana Power Company, two corporations that exerted a tremendous degree of power over
politicians and the press and thus represent the political influence of private capital throughout
the era in question.
In order to understand the motives and actions of those who shaped river development in
the twentieth century and those who reacted to it, I have consulted a number of archival
collections and newspaper sources. Much of the evidence supporting this thesis was found in the
archives of the Mike and Maureen Mansfield Library in Missoula, Montana, and the Montana
Historical Society Research Center in Helena, Montana. In Missoula I read extensively in the
Clifton Merritt Papers which contain documents relating to wilderness preservation, the Harry
Billings Montana Power Collection which contains research documents related to the Montana
Power Company and their efforts against public power, the John R. Garber Papers which contain
materials published by the Committee for Paradise Dam, the Mike Mansfield Papers which
contain extensive correspondence on all relevant subjects, the Lorena M. Burgess Papers which
provide insight into a unique Native perspective and the perspective of people living along the
Lower Flathead River, and the Walter H. McLeod Papers which helped me to assess Columbia
Basin development from a businessman’s perspective. In Helena I consulted the Francis Logan
Merriam Papers, which document the activities of the Democratic Party and the Committee for
Paradise Dam; the J. Hugo Aronson Papers, which contain several speeches given by Governor
Aronson in opposition to new dams; the Lee Metcalf Papers, which are extensive and provide
insight into dozens of dam proposals as well as correspondence with wilderness advocates and
members of Native American tribes; the Montana Fisheries Division Records, which contain
survey data regarding hydropower projects; the Perry S. Melton Papers, which give some insight
into labor union activity in western Montana; and the Winton Weydemeyer Papers, which proved
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to be a tremendous insight into heterodox environmentalist thought. What could not be discerned
through archival materials has been accessed through newspaper records, primarily those of the
Flathead Courier and Char-Koosta, a newsletter published by the CSKT. Despite the volume of
documents consulted in constructing this thesis, there are still many more archival records that
could provide a historian with even greater insight into the activities of groups such as the
Committee for Paradise Dam and the Montana Power Company.
The West is a unique and varied place that resists easy characterization. Nonetheless, the
following three chapters set out to do just that, tracing the course of western hydropower
development from the early days of private dam construction through the New Deal expansion of
public power and the ensuing decades of backlash that it inspired. Chapter One, “Without
Harming Anyone,” provides an overview of the regulation of water power in the Progressive Era
and New Deal, before delving into a detailed look at two exemplary dams. The dam at the mouth
of Flathead Lake, which was known as Kerr Dam until 2015 when it was renamed Seli’š Ksanka
Qlispe’ (SKQ) Dam, serves as an example of private power development and the challenges to
Native sovereignty posed by water power development.27 Hungry Horse Dam, with its unique
power marketing scheme, represents the ideal that public power Democrats were striving for in
river valleys throughout the West. Chapter Two, “Democracy in Retreat,” follows the attempts in
the 1940s to expand public power nationwide through the creation of river valley authorities in
the model of the Tennessee Valley Authority. Following the defeat of the valley authority plans,
public power Democrats suffered further defeat at Hells Canyon, where the Eisenhower
Administration granted license to the Idaho Power Company, rather than the Bureau of
Reclamation, to build a series of power dams. Chapter Three, “Preserving Paradise,” carries the
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story into the 1960s, focusing on the multiple overlapping proposals to dam the Lower Flathead
River. Amidst the threat of termination and the possibility of Paradise Dam flooding 20,000
acres on the reservation, CSKT leaders sought authorization for their own dams at Buffalo
Rapids. That plan was opposed by the Montana Power Company, Montana’s Democratic
Senators, conservationists, and some members of the tribes. The seemingly interminable conflict
between mutually exclusive plans ultimately dragged on long enough that no group could muster
the political or financial capital to build a single dam.
How exactly to preserve the greatest good, for the greatest number, over the longest
period of time in the management of western water power has always been as much a question of
morality than engineering. Resource conflicts have been shaped by competing conceptions of the
public good, varying claims of who counts toward the greatest numbers, and exactly how long
systems will hold. As they debated the legacies of Pinchot and Roosevelt, Mapes and
Weydemeyer disagreed about more than just the economic or hydrological viability of two
different water storage and power generation schemes. They were expressing fundamentally
incompatible understandings of the public good. For Mapes, the federal government was the
greatest instrument for the development of resources for the benefit of the whole nation.
Anything less than the full development of all potential water power and the distribution of that
power at the lowest possible cost was a betrayal of the conservation principles laid down by
Roosevelt and Pinchot. For Weydemeyer those same government instruments held unparalleled
potential to squander resources on wasteful and destructive schemes. Federal dams were not only
bad engineering, they also undermined both the rugged natural beauty and the free enterprise
system that anchored his conception of the public good. He believed that his proposal for smaller
private dams on every tributary stream throughout the mountain West was the superior plan not
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just on an engineering level, but an ideological one as well. Still others presented their own
conceptions of the good—whether it was best served by regulating utilities or allowing them to
compete freely—and of the public—whether it consisted of every citizen equally on all matters
or only of members of an affected region, state, or tribe. Although neither the Paradise Dam, the
tribal dams, or the headwaters flood control scheme were ever built, the decades of debate over
the role of the government, corporations, and communities in the conservation, preservation, and
development of resources in Western Montana shaped the American West throughout the
Twentieth Century.
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Chapter One
“Without Harming Anyone”: Kerr, Hungry Horse and regulation of hydropower

During the first half of the twentieth century, hydropower transformed the modes of
production and patterns of life in the Mountain West. From 1906 to 1953 residents of Montana’s
Flathead Basin struggled to direct the process according to their own understanding of the public
interest. The mighty rivers cascading down from the snowcapped peaks of the Rocky Mountains
have long captivated farmers, sportsmen, industrialists, and naturalists whether as a source of
water, fish, electricity, or scenic splendor. Particularly in the West, how to distribute water
resources equitably, what constitutes the best use of a limited resource, is a foundational
question. The addition of electricity production to the already crowded claims on western
waterways further complicated matters, while revealing new horizons of possibility for social
and economic reform.
Like other aspects of western development, electrification was undertaken by a mix of
public and private authorities with sometimes competing and sometimes compatible social and
financial objectives. The first hydroelectric projects were built and managed by private power
companies, often in the service of extractive industries. In Montana, executives of the Anaconda
Copper Mining Company launched the Montana Power Company in 1912 as a separate but
affiliated entity to distribute power to smelting and milling operations in Butte and Bonner. In
response to the rise of hydropower companies, progressive reformers pieced together a
regulatory regime to counter the monopolistic tendencies of investor-owned utilities. The multi
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decade struggle to formulate a coherent system for regulating water power in the public interest
led many to question whether the private sector—even when strictly regulated—could be trusted
with power production at all. By the 1930s, they began to pursue federal power development as a
tool for economic justice and the full development of the nation’s resources.
This chapter traces the development of water power on the Flathead River over the first
half of the twentieth century from the surveying of power sites on the Flathead Reservation
through the construction of Hungry Horse Dam on the South Fork of the Flathead. The Kerr
Dam at the mouth of Flathead Lake completed in 1938 and the Hungry Horse Dam on the South
Fork of the Flathead River built from 1948–1953 are products of distinct but related visions of
modernization resulting from the specific circumstances and individuals who contributed to their
authorization and construction. In order to understand these two projects, it is necessary to first
take a broad look at the development of water power regulation and rural electrification in the
West and throughout the nation. The Kerr Dam is deeply entangled in the history of water power
regulation and struggles over control of resources on the Flathead Reservation. Hungry Horse
Dam was, in contrast, the product of a more ambitious and transformative approach to water
power forged in the New Deal and war mobilization. That approach along with the construction,
location, and management of the Hungry Horse project were colored by the experience that
legislators had with the Montana Power Company and the Army Corps of Engineers at Kerr
Dam in the previous decades. The history of both dams is a window into how people in twentieth
century Montana sought to harness river power as a means of social and economic reform.
While water power has been harnessed for production throughout human history,
developments in the late nineteenth century drastically increased the potential for river
modifications to transform society. Frank Sprague's electric motor allowed river power to be
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transmitted over long distances, revolutionizing water power and the production that it could
support. With the advent of hydroelectric power in the 1880s, low head dams which had been
built for onsite milling operations gave way to massive high dams capable of transmitting power
to far away cities. While this new technology was first implemented on the Fox River in
Wisconsin and Niagara Falls in New York, its true potential to shape human geography was
found in the West with the Feather River and American River dams in California supplying
power to factories in far off Sacramento. Whereas Eastern cities located their industry along the
river or coal plant, western industries which grew primarily in the age of electrification could be
located farther from the sites that generated their power.28
Conflicts soon arose over who would be allowed to build hydropower dams at various
sites. River power naturally tends toward monopoly, as a dam on any portion of a river alters the
water and land available to other river users.29 Progressive Era reformers who saw business
monopolies as a grave threat to democracy went after the electric companies in their pursuit of
greater economic equality and well ordered infrastructure. Foremost among these Progressive
electricity reformers was Gifford Pinchot. In his role as Chief Forester and as Governor of
Pennsylvania, Pinchot made an enemy of the private utilities, declaring in 1925 that private
electricity’s threat to democracy was “immeasurably the greatest industrial fact of our time.”
Pinchot was an enemy of “Big Power," but at the same time a consummate progressive with
regard to the transformative power of modern technology, stating that “if effectively controlled
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in the public interest it [electricity] can be made incomparably the greatest material blessing in
human history.”30
Even among self described progressives, there were major disagreements over how best
to develop electrical resources. During the Roosevelt and Taft administrations, federal officials
were at odds over whether social progress was best facilitated by opening federal property to
private development without conditions or imposing strict terms on power developers. Early
water power development had been guided by free market principles, with private energy
companies given indefinite authorization to build dams and extract profits from rivers on federal
land. Pinchot and his allies caused a stir throughout the Roosevelt and Taft administrations for
fighting against power sites given away, "forever and for nothing.”31 Beginning with the
legislative struggle over the Muscle Shoals project on the Tennessee River in Alabama and
Pinchot’s strict limits on dams and power lines built within National Forest lands, the federal
government began reducing the longevity of leases and charging power companies for “the
privilege” of monopolizing a public resource.32
Roosevelt’s critics blamed Pinchot’s policies for stymying development by imposing
financial burdens on power companies. Pinchot saw things differently. According to Pinchot the
power companies often sought authorization for projects that they had no intention to build,
merely to prevent others from building competing dams, a concept which sheds light on the
Buffalo Rapids controversy of the 1960s, discussed in Chapter 3.33 By imposing stricter
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conditions, Pinchot believed that he was ensuring development, not hampering it. Only those
entities, public or private, which were serious about efficient and rapid development would be
given authorization. The decades-long conflict within the federal government resulted in the
passage of the Federal Water Power Act of 1920 which created the Federal Power Commission
(FPC), shifting responsibility for coordinating hydropower development from the individual
states to the national government. In its initial form, the FPC was a committee of three members:
the Secretaries of War, Interior, and Agriculture. The commission was reorganized in 1930 into a
five-member committee with members appointed by the president and subject to Senate
approval. It was further strengthened in 1935 when it was given a full-time staff. Montana
legislator Burton K. Wheeler gave a legal defense for the FPC on the basis that the potential for
electricity to be transmitted between states firmly placed energy policy under the purview of
Congress.34 Creating the FPC changed the nature of power conflicts, but it did not put an end to
fights over power licensing. Pinchot’s suspicions about private utilities would be born out in the
following decades on the Flathead River, as the Montana Power Company delayed, deferred, and
disrupted dam building and reneged on their promises to the people of the Flathead Reservation.
The effects of electrification were felt immediately in America’s urban industrial settings,
but the benefits of new technology arrived much slower in rural America. In 1935, only one in
ten farms had access to electricity, and much of those generated their own power on site, rather
than tying into a regional grid. Urban workers had been taking Sprague streetcars to factories lit
by Edison electric lights for nearly fifty years while outside the cities farmers were still primarily
working with muscle power. Reform minded politicians saw that disparity as a matter of
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injustice, not merely inconvenience.35 Yet while many farmers were eager to adopt new
technology, some were skeptical of who would benefit from the efficiency gains brought on by
electricity and mechanical farm tools. These critical farmers saw reductions in the amount of
work needed to produce crops benefiting city dwellers by lowering their food costs while putting
thousands of farm hands out of work as their skills became redundant and inefficient. Those
concerns led to friction between rural and urban communities during the early years of the Great
Depression, but overall momentum was on the side of expanding electrification.36
Early attempts at rural electrification were largely unsuccessful, due in large part to a
public relations campaign waged by the National Electric Light Association throughout the
1920s. Building transmission lines in rural areas was not a profitable endeavor for the power
companies, and the prospect of government assistance to rural electricity users was seen as
antithetical to the free enterprise system, as the government did not have to obey the rules of
market competition.37 The fight against private electricity throughout that decade was led by a
bipartisan group of progressives headed by Republicans Gifford Pinchot and Robert La Follette
along with Democrats including Montana’s Tom Walsh and Burton K. Wheeler.38 In the 1924
presidential election, La Follette ran a third party presidential campaign with Wheeler in the Vice
Presidential slot. The chief plank of La Follette’s campaign platform was public ownership of
utilities. While La Follette only won his home state of Wisconsin, the progressive ticket swept
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twenty Montana counties and placed a close second to the Republicans in 11 states west of the
Mississippi.39
With his newfound national acclaim following the election, Burton Wheeler returned to
Congress ready to carry on his fight against the private power monopoly. Wheeler, a selfdescribed “Yankee from the West,” had left his stuffy upbringing in Massachusetts to attend law
school in Michigan before wandering through just about every city and boom town he could
from Tucson to Telluride and Portland to Pocatello. He finally settled in the mining city of Butte,
Montana in 1905 by accident after losing his train ticket and all of his savings in a poker game.
In the gritty and often violent atmosphere of early twentieth century Butte, Wheeler quickly
gained a reputation as a defender of workers’ rights, winning election to the state legislature in
1910 and later serving as a US Attorney and as representative of Montana’s first Congressional
District.40 In the 1930s, Wheeler dealt a major blow to the energy monopolies with the WheelerRayburn Act or Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935. The act, which expanded the
power of the SEC to break up utilities holding companies, was seen as a direct threat to electrical
utilities and their shareholders who editorialized in Montana newspapers about how the bill
would be the end of the Montana Power Company.41
The same year that the Wheeler-Rayburn Act passed, Congress created the Rural
Electrification Administration, a measure that some historians consider among the most
significant and enduring aspects of the New Deal.42 Through the REA, the federal government
aided in the establishment of local cooperatives, distributed low interest loans, and provided
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technical schematics for electricity infrastructure. REA money helped county level co-ops build
transmission lines to connect into the existing high voltage systems that spanned the mountain
west. Local energy coops, most of which still provide power to customers today, charged lower
rates and provided consistent service in areas that private power did not serve. For western
politicians like Mike Mansfield, the REA was a triumph.43 The mandate to provide power to all
customers was especially significant in rural states like Montana. In 1963, Rural Electrification
Administration co-ops in Montana served 1.5 customers per mile, while the Montana Power
Company served 17.5 per mile. As a result of both the rural customer base and the lower prices
they offered, REA co-ops made only $414 of revenue per mile of line annually compared to
$6,580 per mile in annual revenue made by Montana Power.44
The REA brought the blessings of electricity to rural America, but not along the Giant
Power model that Pinchot had proposed, nor the Democracy on the March dreams of David
Lilienthal. Unlike David Lilienthal and Arthur Morgan’s TVA, the REA functioned more like a
bank combined with an engineering firm than a power company. While a significant intervention
into the economy, the REA, like many New Deal agencies, represented a sort of compromise
between the vision of the more radical reformers and the opposition’s fears of government
control. The fact that the REA was less radical than Pinchot’s Giant Power or the TVA did not
stop critics from calling for it to be dismantled, especially once the majority of rural counties had
been successfully electrified.45 Neither did the Roosevelt administration see REA as the ultimate
solution to the country's uneven electrical development. Roosevelt advanced a plan for “Seven
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Little TVAs” that would bring every major river system in the United States under federal
management. These proposed river valley authorities will be discussed in the following chapter.
Putting rural America on the grid led to an increase in demand for electricity and
demands for lower utility bills. As a larger swath of the country joined the ranks of consumers
purchasing electrical appliances and paying monthly heating bills, politicians sought to expand
energy generation and challenge the power monopolies. While the antitrust efforts of New Deal
liberals faced varying success and failure throughout FDR’s presidency and beyond, adding
more generating capacity to the grid was a broadly popular and successful project.46 Building
new power plants—especially by damming western rivers—was seen as the surest way to
provide reliable energy and reduce costs to consumers while creating manufacturing jobs
throughout the country.
Along the Flathead River, hydropower development engendered conflicts over by whom
and for whom that development would take place. The first plans for damming the Flathead
River were proposed in 1906.47 Engineers devised a five-dam project with the first and most
important dam to be located at the mouth of Flathead Lake. Various entities looked upon this
plan for developing the power potential of the lower Flathead quite differently. The Montana
Power Company saw these dams as a means of claiming resources which white profiteers had
been barred from accessing by the Hellgate Treaty. Agents of the Bureau of Indian Affairs saw
the dams as an economic opportunity for the Flathead Reservation. White settlers alternatively
saw the dams as a threat to their land claims or a welcome source of surplus power and irrigation
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storage. Salish and Kootenai people, while split over the idea of altering the river, were opposed
to further encroachment by white people on their shrinking reservation. These conflicting
understandings stalled the construction of any dams on the Flathead until well into the 1930s and
questions of compensation would remain unanswered for decades after a dam was built.
Designating a power site involves more than merely selecting the location of a dam;
every acre of land with the potential to be flooded by a future reservoir has to be secured as well.
Purchasing land for reservoirs on the Lower Flathead was made all the more fraught by ongoing
conflicts over access to farmland and irrigation water. While planning for dams along the lower
reaches of the Flathead River, federal land managers were frustrated by squatters illegally
occupying land reserved for power sites in the Flathead Allotment Act of 1904. But squatters at
power sites were only one aspect of a long history of conflict and conquest on the lands of the
Salish, Kootenai, and Pend Oreille people which had led Interior Secretary Ballinger to
condemn, “the cupidity of white men, which interferes on every hand and at every turn with the
successful and efficient administration of Indian affairs.”48
The Flathead Reservation was established as the sovereign territory of the Salish,
Kootenai, and Pend Oreille people in the Hellgate Treaty of 1855. The territory, while rich in
resources and scenic beauty, was a massive reduction in land from that which the tribes had
previously occupied. While the tribes agreed to the treaty, they did so under false pretenses and
as the result of questionable translations. Jesuit priest Fr. Adreon Hoeken who was witness to the
negotiation called it a “ridiculous tragicomedy” and lamented, “ “When, oh when, shall the
oppressed Indian find a poor corner of the earth on which he may lead a peaceful life.” 49 It was
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not until 1891 and not without considerable coercion that Chief Charlo’s band of the Salish
relocated from the Bitterroot Valley—land which was proposed as an alternative reservation,
before President Grant ordered otherwise in 1871—to what was then called the Jocko
Reservation. Efforts to remove Native Americans from valuable lands and integrate them into
American society continued throughout the late nineteenth century, particularly with the General
Allotment Act of 1887, which allowed for the division of reservation lands into individual plots
with all “surplus” acreage to be sold to white homesteaders. This policy, while couched in
paternalistic language that insisted it was for the good of white and Native alike, was a blatant
abrogation of treaties in order to access the forests and minerals located on reservations.
Colorado Congressman James Belford stated the goal of allotment plainly, “an idle and thriftless
race of savages cannot be permitted to guard the treasure vaults of the nation.” 50 Allotment was
clearly about race and power more so than progress or development, as the Salish and Kootenai
were far from idle or thriftless. In the years following the Hellgate Treaty, the tribes of the
Flathead Reservation had become extremely successful farmers and cattlemen, with tribal
members owning around 30,000 head of cattle and selling over 1,000 tons of wheat to off
reservation customers in 1903. Yet that economic success was threatened by the strict acreage
restrictions of allotment policy. The people of the Flathead Reservation had resisted allotment for
years with Chief Isaac of the Kootenai telling Indian Agents in 1901, “You tell me I was poor
and needed money, but I am not poor… We haven’t any more land than we need, so you had
better buy from somebody else.” However, the demands of white settlers were eventually
granted by Congress in the Flathead Allotment Act of 1904.51
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With the 1904 Act, the 1,245,000-acre reservation was effectively reduced to 245,000
acres with the remaining “surplus” land opened to white settlement. Of the $7,410,000 that the
land was valued at, the tribes were paid only $1,783,549, which was held in trust by the Bureau
of India Affairs. A drastic reduction of available land was disastrous to the grazing and gathering
practices of the Salish and Kootenai, resulting in widespread poverty on the reservation. Thus,
when hydropower engineers declared some 50,000 acres of land necessary to produce power “in
the interest of the Flathead Tribe,” tribe members did not see a benevolent modernization project,
but rather one more act in an ongoing saga of unjust land grabs.52
While many members of the tribes were skeptical of hydropower development, some
aligned themselves with whites who promoted power dams as a source of sustainable revenue for
the tribes and economic opportunity for all Montanans. Agents of the Bureau of Indian Affairs
saw the resources of the Flathead Reservation as tools for the economic and social advancement
of tribe members. Whether out of corruption, nobility, or paternalism, under the Indian Agents
the abundant timber, minerals, farmland, and water power of the Flathead Reservation were not
utilized in a manner which reflected those principles. Instead, they were sold for below market
value, harvested unsustainably, or stolen. The forests which had been a source of economic
wellbeing for the Salish and Kootenai were cut more rapidly on the reservation than in the
adjacent National Forests, especially following the Allotment Act. While money from these
extractive enterprises funded schools, roads, and per capita payments on the reservation, the
companies contracted by the BIA made considerable profits in the process. Yet some members
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of the tribes insisted on continuing the extractive practices even after the BIA imposed
conservation minded limits on logging and mining on the Reservation.53
Members of the tribes held a variety of opinions about dams and resource use in general.
With regard to hydropower, Kerr dam presented an opportunity for development which not all
members of the tribes opposed, even if they did object to the manner in which the whole affair
was conducted. Reflecting on the construction of Kerr Dam and the loss of the “Place of Falling
Waters,” novelist and tribal member D’Arcy McNickle lamented how “white man makes us
forget our holy places,” whereas former tribal council member E. W. Morigeau in his
autobiography primarily remembered the good pay and the opportunity to operate heavy
machinery.54 In a 1990 documentary, Roy Bigcrane and Thompson Smith placed the dam at the
center of the whole history of the Flathead Reservation calling it the culmination of, “eighty
years of assault on the sovereignty of the people.”55 For nearly all members of the tribes—
whether or not they agreed on how to use it—sovereignty over their own lives, land, and
resources was their primary goal. Questions of conservation and preservation, overuse and under
development, would certainly need to be settled, but first the tribes needed the right to answer
these questions for themselves.56
That opportunity came to a degree with the Wheeler Howard Act of 1934, which was a
centerpiece of the Indian New Deal. The Meriam Report of 1928 had awakened some leaders in
Washington as to the damage that allotment had wrought, information which justified a change
in federal policy. Under the Wheeler-Howard Act, tribes were encouraged to adopt their own
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constitutions. While still under the trusteeship of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, this allowed for a
degree of sovereignty over tribal resources and an opportunity to reclaim some of what had been
lost under allotment. Burton Wheeler, in authoring the legislation, harbored some of the same
assimilationist motivation that Dawes had in writing the Allotment Act, believing that tribal
sovereignty would be a step on the road to ending the tribe’s relationship with the federal
government. Regardless of his motivation however, the Act allowed the tribes of the Flathead
Reservation to reform as the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead
Reservation (CSKT), becoming the first federally recognized tribal government.57
While allotment and reorganization were shifting the balance of power on the
Reservation, federal engineers were planning for the development of all available water power.
In 1926 the BIA proposed a small dam capable of generating only 4 MW of power to be used for
pumping irrigation water, but this modest plan did not match the development ambitions of the
moment. The FPC instead granted Rocky Mountain Power—a subsidiary of the Montana Power
Company—a license in 1927 to construct and operate a dam capable of generating 90 MW at the
mouth of Flathead Lake. The site for the dam was a sacred place on the Flathead River known as
Royal Gorge by white settlers and as 'a·kniⱡ ka’nuk or “narrow pass between cliffs” in the
Kootenai language and st̓ipmétkʷ or “the place of falling waters” in the Salish language.58 Burton
Wheeler was among those who disapproved of the FPC’s decision, especially after hearing of an
alcohol soaked meeting between Montana Power executives and respected members of the
tribe.59 Wheeler managed to secure payment for the tribe from Montana Power, which he later
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claimed was, “the first time in the history of the United States that Indians were indemnified with
royalties.”60 In a speech at the Lake County Fair that fall he lamented that the government was
unable to construct the dam on its own, but conceded that rapid development was of the utmost
importance and thus the private sector should proceed with construction. Polson residents were
excited to see test drilling begin, with the Flathead Courier reporting that “The Indian should be
the happiest man in the Flathead valley… The white residents of the valley should rejoice…”
because the new dam would provide cheap power for irrigation and attract new industries. 61
The rejoicing was premature, as the onset of the Great Depression led Montana Power to
delay construction and reduce payments to the tribes. The agreed upon annual payment of
$60,000 which was based upon a low-end estimate of power production, was reduced to a mere
$1,000 per month. By 1934, construction was still halted, and Interior Secretary Harold Ickes
threatened to cancel the FPC license, even floating the possibility of handing the project over to
the WPA. The issue was resolved by Attorney General Homer Cummings who gave Montana
Power five years to complete the project before their contract would be declared void and the
company would be forced to pay damages for the delay.62
The threats from Washington D.C. got the project back on track, and it was completed in
1938. At the dedication ceremony, effusive praise was laid upon Montana Power Company
president Frank Kerr, for whom the dam was named. Cornelius F. Kelly, president of the
Anaconda Company delivered the keynote address and declared Kerr to be, “more than any other
responsible for the consummation of this great accomplishment.” Kelly described Kerr as a
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“great engineer who rose from obscure and difficult beginnings,” but Kelly was not describing
Kerr’s ability to design and construct power plants—something which he had done, but never
received any special training in—but rather the engineering of business which Kerr had
mastered. He excelled at creating useful machines out of people for shareholder profit. Kelly’s
address went on to place Kerr at the center of a fundamental transformation of Montana from a
useless wilderness into a thriving empire: “Within that time [the 50 years Kerr lived in Montana]
a mountain empire has been opened and developed… In every stage of this development Frank
Kerr did his part, and in a large measure in it he led.” If Kelly’s assessment of his friend and
colleague was hyperbolic, even more so was his hope for the longevity of Kerr’s memory. The
dam was to be a monument to Kerr that would outlast “The snows of endless winters” and
preserve his name, “for an unmeasurable time…” Seventy-seven years after his speech, the name
was changed by the Confederated Tribes to the Seli’š Ksanka Qlispe’Dam.63
While Cornelius Kelley sang the praises of a self-made industrialist whose will
had single handedly shaped Montana, other speakers emphasized the role of the
government in directing the project to its final completion. Burton Wheeler remarked that
“No place in the United States has the government written as stringent a contract with a
power company as they have here and they have done it for the benefit of the Indians and
of the white settlers upon this reservation.” Montana’s Democratic Governor Roy Ayers
lauded the dam as a model of public-private partnership describing it as “the first instance
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in which private capital has joined with state and federal governments in such a
program.”64
The opening ceremonies were filled with calls for unity between public and
private and between white and native. Former state senator A. J. Bower served as master
of ceremonies, opening the event by stating “There is not an individual on this program,
be he red or white, whose ancestral roots do not go down into the very soil upon which
we are here gathered.” Bower doubled down on his claim about the Native roots of the
white politicians and industrialists present by emphasizing the honorary tribal
memberships that each of them had. He introduced Governor Ayers as an honorary Gros
Ventur, introduced Burton Wheeler as “another of the aborigines” joking about whether
or not his “feet are white or black,” and introduced Kerr himself as “one of our own
Injuns.” Bower’s comments were played for laughs in the Flathead Courier the next day,
but Salish Chief Martin Charlo and Kootenai Chief Koostahtah did not seem amused in
their brief remarks. Charlo stated simply that he was glad that Mr. Kerr was happy, but
that he had yet to receive any money for the dam and “will be glad when the money is
paid in.”65 His remarks were followed immediately by a performance of the showtune
“Indian Love Call” by Soprano Courtney Proffitt before “red men and whites gathered
together to eat barbecued buffalo.”66
In 1938 the dam was completed and began transmitting power, but the arduous and
corrupt process had lent credence to the accusations that Pinchot and others had leveled against
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private power.67 The mission of the BIA to provide jobs and revenue for the tribes while securing
power for both white and native irrigators on the reservation had only been achieved by threats
from the highest levels of government. While the dam was built and monthly payments were
made to the tribes, Montana Power resisted paying any more than $60,000 per year even as their
revenue from Kerr rose with the installation of new turbines and augmented water supply from
Hungry Horse Dam upstream, an issue that was only resolved when the CSKT sued MPC in
1962.68 As for attracting the industry which had made the Courier editors rejoice, no new
factories relocated to Polson, the nearest town to Kerr. Years later Mike Mansfield would claim
that, “the vast majority of the power generated at those plants [Kerr, Cabinet Gorge, and Noxon
Rapids Dams] is exported out of Montana, not utilized within the State.” Utilizing Montana’s
resources in order to improve life in Montana would motivate the Senator from Butte to write his
first piece of legislation and leave his mark permanently on the physical and social landscape of
the state.69
The arduous process of seeing Kerr Dam through to completion was viewed by western
Democrats as a clear example of the problems inherent to power monopolies and the risk that
comes with trusting for-profit entities to carry out what was seen as the moral project of natural
resource development. The profit motive and the wise-use principle laid competing claims to the
irreplaceable natural resources of the nation. Investor-owned utilities were lithe to delay
construction, file applications for projects they had no intention to build, renege on commitments
to compensate landowners, limit power supply to higher paying urban customers, and sell energy
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without regard for its social impact. Having seen that pattern repeated time and again by Idaho
Power, Montana Power, Washington Water Power, and others, liberals and progressives sought a
greater role for the federal government in the power market than merely planning and
licensing.70
The Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers planned and constructed
dams throughout the 1930s as part of the larger public works and reclamation programs,
constructing impoundments that would have seemed impossible a generation previous. In the
massive concrete facades and vibrating powerhouses of Grand Coulee, Shasta, and Boulder
Dam, the engineers of the New Deal were forging in a literal sense, the “instrument of
unimagined power for the establishment of a morally better world” of the President’s second
inaugural address.71 When war broke out in Europe the excessive amounts of energy generated
by the rivers of the rural West were imbued with strategic importance. The War Department took
control of power production and sought out more generating capacity to keep factories humming.
The ample hydropower resources of the Northwest and the demand for aluminum to build
airplanes made the Columbia Basin the leading aluminum producing region in the world, despite
there being no natural source of aluminum in the region. To meet the rising demand, dozens of
dams were planned for the Inland Northwest including Noxon Rapids, Cabinet Gorge, Nine Mile
Prairie, Hungry Horse, Glacier View, Spruce Park, and Paradise in the Clark Fork-Flathead basin
alone. New hydroelectric projects, however, would take two or three years to complete and each
would require the labor of hundreds of fighting age men. In order to get more power online
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quickly, the Army Corps of Engineers devised a short list of projects that could be completed in
under a year, including a plan to raise the height of Kerr Dam.72 That proposal sparked a
controversy that launched the political career of one of Montana’s most decorated statesmen and
reshaped the landscape of western Montana.
“This is the most important letter I have ever written in my life” began Representative
Mike Mansfield’s letter to the president in July 1943.73 Earlier that year, the Army Corps of
Engineers and the Bonneville Power Administration had begun investigating the possibility of
raising the level of Lake Pend Oreille in Idaho and Flathead Lake in Montana to provide a
greater supply of water to Grand Coulee and Bonneville Dams downstream. The plan was to
raise Flathead Lake by 17 feet in the first two years and an additional 20 feet after that. Were the
lake level to be raised according to the 1943 plan, the towns of Bigfork, Somers, Elmo, and
Dayton, as well as parts of Polson and Kalispell would have been permanently submerged.
Montana’s congressional delegation was not initially briefed on the plan until Mike Mansfield
had heard so many rumors from his constituents that he demanded answers from BPA
administrator Paul Raver. With the help of his colleagues in Congress and his constituents,
particularly Perry Melton of the Flathead County Central Trades and Labor Council, Mansfield
set about finding a suitable replacement project to save the lake towns while still providing the
necessary power for war industries.74 He appealed to President Roosevelt stating that “The
Flathead has sent between 3,000 and 4,000 of its sons and daughters into the Armed Forces of
the United States to fight to protect their homes and their country. I sincerely hope that when
they return they will not find they have won the war abroad only to find they have lost their

72

Interior Secretary Julius Krug to Perry Melton, July 9, 1943, Perry Melton Papers (PMP), box 13, folder 14.
“My dear Mr. President,” Mike Mansfield to Franklin Roosevelt, July 8, 1943, PMP, box 13, folder 14.
74
Mike Mansfield, Speech to US House of Representatives on Raising Flathead Lake, undated (July 1943?) PMP,
box 13, folder 14.
73

36

valley.”75 Reflecting on his career in a 2000 interview with Don Oberdorfer, the longest serving
Senate Majority Leader and former ambassador to Japan insisted that preventing the raising of
Flathead Lake was the most important thing he had done in his entire career.76
Defeating the Kerr Dam modification had the knock-on effect of jump starting the
Hungry Horse project which had been a desire of Flathead County boosters for some time. The
South Fork of the Flathead River begins its long journey to the Pacific Ocean high on the
continental divide in the middle of one of the largest roadless areas in the contiguous United
States flowing north for nearly 100 miles and draining more than 1,072,680 acres of land before
combining with the Middle Fork to form the main Flathead River at Bad Rock Canyon in Martin
City, Montana.77 The Canyon Area, as it is known by locals, was one of the last regions of
Montana to be reached by the railroad due to the difficult terrain between Flathead Lake and the
continental divide and the resistance of the Blackfeet Nation. Following the Blackfoot Treaty of
1895 and the creation of Glacier National Park in 1910, the area became a popular destination for
tourists, although visitors seldom ventured into the wild valleys of the South Fork.78 For
hydropower advocates, the wilderness character of the South Fork made it an ideal place to
locate a reservoir. Seeing the demand for power as inelastic and ever increasing, the alternative
was to flood half a dozen towns along with roads and farms along the lake. Areas such as the
South Fork which had not been settled were not seen as ecological oases, but rather as sacrifice
zones, areas of wasted potential not yet serving a human need.79
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In addition to the zero-sum logic by which either the lake towns or the South Fork Valley
were destined to be flooded, Hungry Horse was also a product of the economic conditions of
Flathead County. Like many rural areas throughout the Mountain West, Flathead County’s
economy in the early twentieth century was primarily supported by extractive industries. Mining,
timber, and railroad construction in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—including a
brief period of coal mining on land that later became Glacier National Park—were responsible
for much of the region’s early development.80 Founded the same year that Montana gained
statehood, Columbia Falls offered “Liberal inducements in the way of Water Power, Cheap Coal,
Wood, Lumber and Millsites to Millmen and Manufacturers” according to an 1890 ad in the
Daily Interlake.81 A dispute between local boosters and James J. Hill led the railroad magnate to
route his Great Northern line around Columbia Falls, but that proved only a minor setback in the
development of a booming timber town. The population of Flathead County rose by 26% in the
1930s as farm families migrated from the dusty plains and settled west of the continental divide.
Yet that growth was not sustainable without new industry. Farmers moving west in the dust bowl
overestimated the productivity of Flathead lands and settled in cut over areas that could not yield
crops. Farm incomes in Flathead Country were lower in Flathead County than the state or
national average and in 1939 as many as 77.2% of farmers in the county were classed as
“stranded” or “migratory” by the Montana State Planning Board.82 Coal mining along the North
and South Fork had not taken off due to the low quality of the deposits and the funding required
to transport ore out of the remote valleys. In his report on the economic prospects of the region,
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BPA surveyor George Sundborg concluded that employment in the timber industry would
continue to decline, “if exploitative cutting practices on private lands continue” and
recommended that a true sustained yield approach be adopted immediately.83 Through
mechanization and exhausting finite resources, these extractive industries were accounting for a
declining share of the economy.
The New Deal had brought Civilian Conservation Corps jobs within the Glacier National
Park and Emergency Conservation Work Camps, but most of the public works programs drew
working age men and women away from rural regions and toward the industrial hubs on the
coasts.84 The general trend of population away from places like Columbia Falls was accelerated
further by World War Two, during which time the population of Flathead County declined by
about 15%. For those who remained, the work was tough and inconsistent as the long harsh
winters slowed logging to a halt for much of the year. While many Americans were enjoying
increasing living standards for the first time since the start of the depression, workers in western
Montana faced seasonal unemployment that made it difficult to provide for their families. The
end of the War only exacerbated that condition further as men returning from service competed
for limited jobs back home. Montana as a whole experienced a loss of population even amidst
the post war baby boom. The Hungry Horse Dam gave people hope that they would be able to
find stable work for a while longer and not have to move to the city. The structure of power
marketing at the dam would guarantee that steady jobs remained in Columbia Falls for
generations.85
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Mike Mansfield was not known to make enemies, but when Montana Power lodged a
protest against appropriations for transmission lines to deliver power from Kerr Dam to the
construction site at Hungry Horse in 1946, he went on the attack. Without the lines, Hungry
Horse was never going to get off the ground. Cornering J. E. Corette as he attempted to leave the
Congressman’s office, Mansfield told the Vice President of Montana Power, “Just a minute. I
want you to know where I stand on this. As far as I am concerned, I do not intend, if I can help it,
to allow any individual, organization, or corporation to stand in my way in getting these
appropriations.” Later that same year a political rival accused Mansfield of being a paid
supporter of “The Company” due to his reluctance to support Senator Murray's Missouri Valley
Authority proposal. Having fought with Company men to save the Lake towns and wrest
Flathead County from the hands of the timber interests, Mansfield resented the accusation and
carried it with him for the rest of his life.86
Construction of Hungry Horse was ongoing between 1947 and 1953, far behind schedule
in Mansfield’s view. He sent a string of letters to engineers and planners at the Department of the
Interior as well as to his congressional colleagues urging increased funding in order to speed the
project along.87 While the reservoir was filled, its future footprint was clear cut which supplied
timber for the nationwide post-war housing boom. The project was a boon to the workers of
Flathead County and much of western Montana, as out of work miners, electrical engineers, and
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lumbermen traveled from elsewhere in the state to work alongside 800 others on the colossal
concrete edifice.88
Four years after the first kilowatts were generated at Hungry Horse Dam, Senator
Mansfield boasted that the 564 foot high dam “is the greatest development, economically, that
has ever happened in the State of Montana. Nobody has been hurt. Everyone has been benefited
by it.”89 The Senator doubled down on his claim to the universal benefit of the project two years
later in a 1959 session of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs stating that the project
had been completed “without harming anybody in the state of Montana, but as a matter of fact,
helping everybody.”90 He attributed much of the success of Hungry Horse to a special provision
of the bill he had written in 1943. In that bill—the first law he had ever written—Mansfield
included a power pricing scheme which allowed firms located within fifteen miles of the dam to
purchase a guaranteed portion of the nearly one billion kilowatt hours of electricity generated at
Hungry Horse at a lower rate than those located further away.91
This unique amendment signaled a shift away from the extractive logic that had long
governed Montana economically. The Mansfield Amendment was predicated on a vision for
Montana’s future in which the mountain state would be the site of manufacturing rather than
merely a source of raw materials. Montana Historian K. Ross Toole famously described Montana
as “a place with a colonial economy.”92 In the 1970s, Michael Malone and Richard Roeder
argued that if state leaders did not continue to actively pursue development projects, “Montana
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will no doubt continue to fall farther behind the economic standards of the nation and will
continue to lose its most valuable resource of all, its youth.”93 Mike Mansfield offered the same
dire warning, stating that the growth of Montana was “dependent on the equitable and proper
exploitation of its abundance of resources.”94 Mansfield saw the power pricing scheme at Hungry
Horse as exactly that, a measure which all but guaranteed that new industries would set up shop
in Columbia Falls. By enticing manufacturing business to locate near the dam, the communities
of Bad Rock Canyon avoided the boom and bust cycle that often came with public works
projects. The aluminum smelter allowed the employment benefits of dam construction to
continue long after the concrete had settled. While advocating for the Libby, Yellowtail, and
Knowles Dams in 1959, then Senator Mansfield stated that Hungry Horse had, “brought in new
industry, broadened the tax base, created greater employment, lowered Rural Electrification
Administration rates, and increased the valuation of Flathead Country from thirty-six million to
eighty-six million dollars.”95 In this same speech, he insisted that the local preference pricing
scheme be incorporated in the authorization for the Knowles Dam on the Lower Flathead River.
While copper mining had been the motive for the first hydro-plants in the state, the power
of the rivers themselves later justified shipping ore from the other side of the country to be
smelted in Montana. Aluminum smelting requires an astronomical amount of electricity, so much
so that quantities of molten aluminum are sometimes measured in kilowatts rather than tons.
Even before Hungry Horse was finished, aluminum companies were competing for the favor of
Montana’s Congressmen. Mansfield and BPA administrator Paul Raver used the competition to
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their advantage, playing the big aluminum companies off of each other to secure the best deal
they could.96 Initially, the Harvey Machine Company, a small firm which had grown through war
production contracts and the distribution of surplus production after the war had committed to
relocating equipment from their smelting operations in California up to Montana. In the end it
was the Anaconda Company that secured the right to power from Hungry Horse Dam and
established an aluminum reduction plant at the base of Teakettle Mountain which opened on
August 15, 1955. The irony of Anaconda—which alongside the Montana Power Company and
the Northern Pacific Railroad had funded a public relations campaign against federal dams
including Hungry Horse—reaping the profits form a federal dam was not lost on Senator James
Murray, who openly criticized the hypocrisy of “the private power companies and other short
sighted interests.”97
With the interconnected grid, dams alone did not guarantee that heavy industry would
relocate to the Flathead Valley, that required planning such that policy could reverse the
demographic trends which otherwise seemed determined by technological progress. More than
just electricity, publicly marketed electricity had saved the upper Flathead from population
decline and seasonal unemployment. Hungry Horse served as a powerful example of what was
possible when federal agencies built power plants and regulated the electricity market.
Montana’s rural electric cooperatives would later boast that “In many respects Hungry Horse is
the perfect dam” as it embodied “the conservation principle of optimum, comprehensive,
multiple purpose development.”98 Through congressional appropriations, the federal government
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was capable of financing far larger dams than private firms and the power produced from those
dams could be marketed at minimal cost to all customers with a preference given to REA co-ops.
Without the necessity to make a profit and exempt from taxation, public power was able to serve
rural communities where private producers were unwilling to extend service. Private power
boosters argued that the federal projects deprived local governments of tax revenue, but when all
of the production and wages generated by a federal dam are considered, federal dams generate a
larger tax base than smaller private dams.
The arguments expressed by Mansfield in his speeches defending Hungry Horse and
criticizing dams such as Kerr and others operated by the Montana Power Company were made
throughout the New Deal and Post-War Eras by reformers intent on reshaping the American
West. Public power and all that it entailed was seen as the core of the New Deal. Preserving and
expanding the work of the New Deal, for the public power lobby, would mean reshaping water
and power governance in order to reshape the landscape and demographics of the West. In order
to accomplish that vision—to achieve full development in the public interest and avoid the
problems of underdevelopment, unemployment, and population decline that resulted from private
river development—they took up Franklin Roosevelt's call for river valley authorities to manage
the economic, ecological, and demographic future of the nation’s largest watersheds. The public
power project and the backlash it engendered from private electricity companies in the Post War
Era played a significant role in shaping politics in the twentieth century.
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Chapter Two:
“Democracy in Retreat”: Breaking the New Deal Public Power Legacy1

Sitting high atop North America and the world’s only triple divide, Montana is upstream
from just about everywhere.2 The Treasure State lays claim to the headwaters of two of the
greatest rivers of North America—the Columbia and Missouri. The source of both mighty
streams lie within National Parks considered to be among the crown jewels of the US
preservation scheme. The eponymous glaciers of Glacier National Park feed the North and
Middle Forks of the Flathead River which go on to add more than seven million acre-feet of
water per year to the Columbia. Near the town of Paradise, Montana, the Flathead joins the Clark
Fork River which by that point has gathered the combined flows of the Blackfoot and Bitterroot
Rivers to become Montana’s largest stream by volume. The combined rivers carry on across the
Idaho Panhandle, paralleling the Kootenai River to the north as that other mighty Columbia
tributary makes its brief 140 mile detour south into the United States. Of the three major
tributaries of the Columbia—Clark Fork, Kootenai, and Snake—Montana is cut off only from
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the Snake, which lies on the Idaho side of the Bitterroot crest which forms Montana’s
southwestern border.3
On the East side of Glacier National Park, creeks feed the Marias and Milk Rivers which
join the Missouri at Loma and Fort Peck respectively. Just over Montana’s southern border in
Wyoming, The Yellowstone River begins its journey to the sea at the 8,130ft Two Ocean Pass
before exiting Yellowstone National Park and gathering water from the scattered ranges of
Eastern Montana. By the time it joins the Missouri at Buford, North Dakota the Yellowstone is
the largest tributary to the Missouri River at more than nine million acre-feet per year. The
Madison River, famed for its fly fishing, cascades down from the western edge of Yellowstone
Park just below the Old Faithful geyser, crashing through Bear Trap Canyon before joining the
Jefferson and Gallatin Rivers to form the Missouri at Three Forks, Montana. Just East of the
capital in Helena the Missouri itself spins the turbines of Hauser Dam, which powered the mines
of Butte before running north through Black Eagle Dam and Ryan Dam above the cascades
which grace the seal of the state of Montana in the “electric city” of Great Falls, where the river
lent its power to the town’s copper smelter from 1890–1980.4
Development of these two vast watersheds was a national priority which Montana
Senator James Murray called “the most important national project since the Louisiana Purchase,”
but how exactly that development ought to be carried out divided politicians, bureaucrats, and
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everyday citizens of the various states affected.5 At stake were the competing visions of
democracy, development, and the American identity. For many progressive public power
advocates, comprehensive development of these two river systems held the potential to create a
more equal and prosperous nation. For the executives of private electricity companies, selective
development held the potential for enormous profits. For the many thousands of who farmed,
fished, and lived their lives along these rivers, the fight over when, where, and how to dam them
was a fight for survival.
The New Deal was the high water mark for public power in the United States. Through
the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt and the tenure of Interior Secretary Harold Ickes, the
progressive dream of reigning in the power monopolies and distributing the blessings of
electricity to all was becoming a reality. Roosevelt had envisioned an overhaul of the nation’s
major river systems under new federal river valley authorities. Following Roosevelt’s death in
1945, many New Dealers sought to build upon the late president’s legacy by carrying out his
wish to repeat the success of the Tennessee Valley Authority in the seven major watersheds of
the nation. For all the planning and years of effort, they were ultimately defeated, opening the
door for private utility companies to regain primacy in the power market in the 1950s.
During the Roosevelt administration, latter-day progressives harnessed the unimagined
power of the new instruments of government in accordance with what James MacGregor Burns
called Roosevelt’s most important single idea: “Not that the government must do everything, but
that everything practicable must be done.”6 Everything practicable included the construction of
dozens of dams throughout the West and the control of electricity markets by federal agencies.
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While the New Deal itself changed shape throughout the Roosevelt years with the coming and
going of various administrators, congresspeople, and judges, the most steadfast arm of the
government was the Department of the Interior. Interior Secretary Harold Ickes was known, over
his thirteen years in office, for his passionate—often wrathful—defense of his beliefs and plans.
He fought against segregation and Japanese internment, in favor of taking in more refugees, and
for a dual program of water power development and wilderness preservation.7 Ickes recognized
that these two prerogatives of the Interior were often at odds with one another, but nonetheless
he sought the middle path between preserving nature and developing resources for human use.
That narrow road, in Ickes’ view, could only be walked through careful planning and attention to
the best available information. To that end, he made a priority of coordinating the patchwork of
state, private, municipal, and federal water projects into coherent entities capable of balancing
national oversight with local input. While Ickes was not always in favor of relinquishing the
Bureau of Reclamation's authority over water in the West, in 1937 he joined with Nebraska
Senator George Norris, President Roosevelt, and TVA co-director David Lilienthal in calling for
new regional valley authorities. In the interest of rapid but sensible development and following
the success of the Tennessee Valley Authority, they proposed “seven little TVAs” encompassing
the major watersheds of the nation including the Connecticut, Arkansas, Colorado, Ohio,
Potomac, Columbia, and Missouri Rivers.8
The proposed river valley authorities were the subject of political campaigns and
newspaper editorials from 1936–1953. For the New Dealers, these not-so-little TVAs were plans
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for both a redistribution of wealth and of population. One version of the Columbia Valley
Administration (CVA) plan promulgated by the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in
1949 emphasized spreading populations throughout the northwest to maintain vibrant
communities and dilute environmental damage. As may be expected, such proposals were
controversial. Opposition to river valley authorities was multifaceted and complex, ranging from
claims of a Soviet conspiracy to counter proposals of interstate and interagency compacts. The
alternatives suggested by all members of the opposition involved greater participation of private
utilities and a diminished role for the federal government in the planning and construction of
dams. Stoking fears about the competence and loyalty of federal planners ultimately led to the
defeat of CVA and other planned valley authorities. The failure of coordinated river valley
authorities signaled a weakness in New Deal governance following the death of Franklin
Roosevelt. Investor-owned utilities and their allies in government seized upon that weakness in
order to secure prime dam sites for themselves and roll back the gains public power had made in
the 1930s and 40s. The march of democracy was pitted against the preservation of free
enterprise, with accusations of underdevelopment and stymied progress on one side and
tyrannical overreach on the other. On the Columbia and Missouri, public power interests won the
authorization of dozens of dams, but failed to bring about a reorganization of federal power
policy. At Hells Canyon, Idaho in the 1950s, private power won a crucial victory. At Paradise
Montana in the early 1960s, both camps found themselves in a quagmire from which neither
would emerge victorious.
Missouri River development—long a dream of politicians with their sights set on western
wealth—carried inherent difficulties due to the extensive and varied land area drained by the
river. The Missouri watershed spans ten states with vastly different topography and two separate
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systems of water law. Annual rainfall in the Eastern Missouri basin is routinely above forty
inches per year, while in the West, the town of Belfry, Montana receives as little as six inches
each year.9 The opposing water and power demands of the various states had stymied Missouri
river dam construction until 1933. From 1933–40 workers in pop-up boom towns on the
Montana plains built the world’s largest earthen dam in order to stabilize seasonal flows for
navigation on the lower Missouri while generating electricity and storing irrigation water for the
farmers of the north plains.10 For all its grandeur however, Fort Peck Dam was not able to
prevent the disastrous flooding of 1943, which prompted competing proposals to fully tame the
Missouri and its tributaries. Army Chief Engineer Lewis A. Pick devised a plan for a series of
large mainstem dams in the upper basin which would flood huge tracts of land—primarily on
Indian reservations—in North Dakota and Montana in order to provide predictable navigation
and reduce flooding in the lower basin states. Reclamation engineer W. G. Sloan sent Congress a
competing plan for the creation of ninety smaller reservoirs on tributary streams which would
optimize irrigation and power production in the upper basin states. While he had initially
supported the Sloan plan, the unproductive squabbling between the states inspired Montana
Senator James Murray to revive the Missouri Valley Authority bill that George Norris had
originally introduced in 1937.11 The Army Corps and Bureau of Reclamation engineers, seeing
their own river control dreams evaporating, quickly settled their differences at the Stevens Hotel
in Omaha and produced the “Pick-Sloan Plan” which combined elements of both in what
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historian Donald Worster called a “paste-together job” and Donald Spritzer described as “more
of a peace treaty than a comprehensive development program.”12
As the merits of a Missouri Valley Authority were debated in the halls of Congress and
the editorial section of newspapers across the region, the agencies set about planning and
constructing as much as they could of the Pick-Sloan Plan. In the course of doing so, they
flooded 155,000 acres of farm and range land on the Fort Berthold Reservation along with
200,000 acres across five Sioux reservations.13 Murray’s attempt to add MVA to the Flood
Control Act of 1944 failed, leaving that law as a permit for the agencies to proceed on course.
MVA supporters did not take that single loss to spell the end of their vision for a valley
authority, picking up the issue again in 1946 under a new president. However, in the intervening
years, opposition to MVA had grown in Montana. Republican Wesley D'Ewart, who had
spearheaded opposition to MVA while head of the Montana Reclamation Association, was
elected to Congress following the death of Montana Representative James O’Connor in 1944.
Murray accused D’Ewart of being a paid agent of the Montana Power Company, the powerful
private electricity company that controlled power distribution throughout most of the state. The
Anaconda Mining Company, which was closely tied to Montana Power, circulated anti-MVA
editorials in all of the major newspapers they owned, with the Montana Standard referring to
MVA as “an irresponsible economic dictatorship.”14 Joining the chorus of opposition to MVA
was the newly formed National Association of Electric Companies—a trade organization
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representing 167 private utilities—which distributed pamphlets such as “Totalitarianism on the
March” and “Bureaucracy Rides the Rivers.” 15
The Missouri Valley Authority failed amidst the opposition of electricity companies from
across the country and lackluster support from key members of the Democratic Party. Historian
Donald Spritzer laid most of the blame for MVA’s failure at Truman’s feet, arguing that the
President never gave the issue his full throated support. However much Truman believed in the
river valley authority model, he was not committed enough to face the opposition mounted by
private utilities and overcome the political hurdles required to unite the interests of ten states. In
1946, the White House lost the strongest political force for river development in the
administration when the old curmudgeon Harold Ickes resigned over Truman’s appointment of
an oil executive to Undersecretary of the Navy. Ickes resignation was seen by many as a
definitive break between Truman and the New Deal, with the vast majority of letters written to
Truman objecting to the loss of an "old warrior" for the crime of "honesty and defense of the
public interest."16 Ickes was replaced at Interior by Julius Krug, who had a track record on public
power from his time at TVA and the War Production Board, but lacked the political instincts
required to navigate western water development. Later that year the Republican Party won their
first congressional majority since 1932 and began to limit funding for Reclamation and TVA
water projects, fearing that federal dam builders were using their printing offices to spread
socialistic ideas. Cutting funding for water in the West cost Republicans in 1948 when they once
again lost control of Congress. Within Montana the MVA issue divided Senator Murray and
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Congressman Mansfield who, later in his life, claimed that the infighting between federal
agencies was his primary concern and that had been resolved by the Pick-Sloan agreement.17
While Montana’s Congressmen were at odds with one another and with the President
about the Missouri Valley, they all found common cause on the other side of the divide. The
Columbia Basin, alongside the Tennessee, was the heartland of public power. The Bonneville
Power Act of 1937 authorized the Bonneville Dam and created the Bonneville Power
Administration, a federal entity tasked with marketing power generated at federal dams
throughout the Columbia Basin. While BPA managed hydroelectricity, the Bureau of
Reclamation distributed irrigation water to the Columbia Basin Project, and the Army Corps of
Engineers managed navigation locks along the lower river. Large federal dams were constructed
with multiple use in mind, but the various agencies tasked with looking after that use left the
river basin suffering under jurisdictional confusion and competing interests. In his history of
Grand Coulee Dam written in 1954, Murray Morgan commented on the complexity of
jurisdiction over the Columbia Basin noting that when he asked a Reclamation public relations
employee for a chart depicting agency responsibilities the PR man retorted “no chart could make
clear what is not clear in the first place.” 18 A catastrophic flood in 1948 completely wiped out
the town of Vanport, OR, raising basin-wide demands for more flood control dams, just as 1943
Missouri floods had.19 In addition to the flood, power demand began to outstrip supply, leading
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to a Pick-Sloan-esque race between the agencies to plan and construct all they could. The result
was the Pick-Straus plan, an ambitious roadmap for damming nearly every inch of freely flowing
water left in the Northwest, tripling the river’s generating capacity and creating a system of locks
and levees that would make Pasco, Washington, and Lewiston, Idaho, seaports. Not wanting to
see their region transformed by the agency engineers alone, Columbia basin labor and
congressional leaders called for the creation of a Columbia Valley Administration, introducing
several versions of the bill to Congress in 1948 and 49. During the 1948 presidential campaign,
Harry Truman toured the northwest extolling the benefits of a Columbia Valley Administration.
CVA was about streamlining bureaucracy and allowing for greater democratic control of natural
resources. At a campaign stop in Salt Lake City Truman stated that big business “had done their
best to make the West an economic colony” but through river development in the public interest,
the West could secure an independent economic future.20 The second Truman administration
began with high hopes for transformational change in the Columbia Basin with the Assistant
Secretary of the Interior boasting, “so far the Republicans and power companies are against it
and the Democrats, labor, and farmers are for it. What more could we ask?”21 His confidence
was misplaced, as the animated debates that ensued ultimately led to the demise of CVA and the
decline of public power nationwide. Before examining the businesses, civic organizations, and
politicians who organized against CVA, it is worth considering just what was at stake from the
view of Columbia Valley Administration advocates.22
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For many twentieth century reformers, the redistribution of population was considered to
be as crucial to the prosperity of the nation as was the redistribution of wealth. In fact, the two
were inextricably linked in the minds of Progressives and New Dealers. Basil Manly, who served
as Vice Chairman of the FPC under Roosevelt had begun predicting a great depression as early
as 1924 which he believed would result from “the alarming decline of American agriculture and
the astounding migration from the farms to the cities” that he described as, “the greatest menace
to the national prosperity and general welfare of the United States.”23 Urbanization, which Manly
and others saw precipitating a decline in living standards for the working class, had been
accelerating with the advent of each new labor saving technology and was further sped along by
the United States’ entrance into the second world war. Federal direction of the economy for war
industries was predicated on maximizing efficiency, not balancing out existing disparities or
curbing negative trends in population. The primary goal was to get guns in the hands of soldiers,
boats on the water, and planes in the air. As War Production Board Director William H. Harrison
stated, “There is only one answer to those who seek to rule the world by force of planes and
ships and tanks and guns. The answer is more planes, more ships, more tanks, and more guns.” 24
Yet for old progressives like James Murray, the social upheavals of war production merited the
same consideration as the rapid deployment of munitions. Born in Ontario and raised in Butte,
Murray began his political career in 1906 as the County Attorney of Silverbow County. While
the Murray family were millionaire copper magnates, they had close ties to the labor movement
and radical Irish politics. After losing a considerable share of his fortune in the stock crash of
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1929, James Murray launched headlong into Franklin Roosevelt’s Democratic Party, winning
one of Montana’s Senate seats in 1934. In the Senate, Murray took on business interests,
especially those using war production as an opportunity to consolidate monopolies. He fought for
universal full employment and universal health insurance for everyone following the war—not
just those who served in the military—and pushed for electric power development and marketing
that would foster evenly distributed populations rather than sprawling industrial cities. 25
The CVA ideal was perhaps best stated in a pamphlet entitled Magnificent
Columbia distributed by the CIO in 1949. The authors made it clear that CVA would be a
bulwark against recreating the sprawl and industrial pollution of the East and Midwest in
the Pacific Northwest. The CIO authors saw those negative outcomes emanating from the
patterns of private development. Crowded, inhuman cities were “the stupid and tragic
outcome of a bad development plan, or no plan at all” and “if these things are left to
chance, profit, or pressure, overcrowding and human misery will necessarily result.” CIO
saw the ultimate goal of a river valley authority as the creation of “smaller, more
pleasant, more human towns” through federal planning guided by local democracy.
While they fought for passage of each CVA bill, they did not believe that their vision was
fully realized in those bills as they were written and introduced, providing critiques of all
existing federal development plans.26
In Magnificent Columbia, the CIO authors set their sights on the environmental
record of the federal agencies and private corporations. The pamphlet opens with the tone
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of a preservationist manifesto: “Too long our American forests, rivers, and minerals have
been exploited for private profit. Too long our soils have been neglected and abused. Too
long our wildlife and recreational resources… have been wantonly destroyed.”27 The CIO
authors believed that under a Columbia Valley Authority, federal administrators would be
required to look after the wellbeing of the whole region, rather than merely providing
power, water, flood control, and navigation. They argued that the flooding experienced in
1948 had been exacerbated by the timber industry which had clearcut the natural flood
protection of the region's forests, even stating that “If the beaver population of the
northwest could be restored, it would help considerably to control floods.” In a
particularly prescient section, the authors stated that “90 percent of all the fingerlings
[juvenile salmon] coming down the Columbia will be killed by the dams already built or
authorized” and that those dams will “almost certainly destroy the salmon runs on the
Columbia-Snake-Salmon-Clearwater.”28 CIO’s writers had clearly been reading the best
available science, and as such they advocated for the Mid Basin Preservation Program.
The program would have set aside the Lower Snake, Clearwater, and Salmon Rivers as
protected salmon habitat, as well as the Cowlitz River, where Tacoma Power’s
Mossyrock and Mayfield dams cut off salmon runs in the 1960s. In addition to the
creation of a protected area, CVA’s emphasis on providing cheap electricity and thereby
attracting industry to smaller cities would have enabled Lewiston, Idaho to become a
manufacturing hub, rather than staking its economic future on becoming a seaport
through the construction of the Lower Snake River Dams. The extinctions, loss of
cultural resources, and loss of jobs in fishing in the four decades since the Lower Snake
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River Dams were constructed, have led many in recent decades to call for their removal.29
The loss of salmon in the Snake River and the political battle over dam removal are
exactly the sort of problems that CVA advocates sought to prevent by forming a river
valley authority. Yet, despite their attention to the looming salmon crisis, the CIO authors
ignored those who suffered most from the loss of salmon—Native American tribes. In
fact, the destruction of culturally significant sites and the poverty experienced on the
Colville, Nez Perce, and Yakima Reservations did not receive even cursory mention in
any of the union’s documents.
A notable point of contention around CVA and the development of the Columbia
Basin generally was the controversial question of locating hydropower dams within
National Parks. While the controversy around the Echo Park Dam in Dinosaur National
Monument is remembered as a pivotal moment in the rise of environmental politics in the
mid twentieth century, an equally significant proposal to dam the North Fork of the
Flathead River within Glacier National Park has received less attention from historians. 30
The Glacier View proposal took advantage of a clause within the 1910 Act creating
Glacier National Park which specified that, “The United States Reclamation Service may
enter upon and utilize for flowage or other purposes any area within said park which may
be necessary.”31 Montana politicians, public power advocates, and Flathead County
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boosters, seeking more power and flood control for the towns of Columbia Falls and
Kalispell, proposed damming the North Fork of the Flathead, which forms the western
boundary of the park.32 In 1943, the Army Corps of Engineers took up the challenge,
submitting plans for a five-hundred-foot-high earthen dam that would rival Hungry Horse
Dam nineteen miles away on the South Fork. Seeing this as a threat not just to elk habitat
and old growth forests, but to the sanctity of the National Park system as a whole,
preservationists rallied nationwide to stop Glacier View citing the example of the Hetch
Hetchy Valley controversy which split preservationists from conservationists in the
1910s. Proponents of the Glacier View Dam argued that a dam on the North Fork could
only enhance the scenic and recreational value of the park, as it would allow families to
access seldom appreciated views of the snowcapped peaks from the comfort of a
motorboat. Bernard DeVoto, in a feature story for the Saturday Evening Post countered
the argument for recreational lakes writing, “Nobody doubts that the American people
need facilities for recreation and will need more of them as our population increases. But
what kind, where, at what cost, and who shall pay for them? … Should Philadelphia and
Birmingham be taxed to provide sailboating for Las Vegas?”33 Following a series of
tense public hearings and months of competing editorials in local and national
newspapers, Glacier View was taken off the table on April 11, 1949, when Interior
Secretary Julius Krug and Army Secretary Kenneth Royall made a formal agreement not
to pursue construction of the Glacier View Dam.34
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CIO believed that a Columbia Valley Administration would be better equipped to
protect places like Glacier than the federal agencies as they were. The authors of
Magnificent Columbia praised the coalition that had fought to stop Glacier View Dam.
They made the case that National Parks and wilderness areas are especially important for
industrial workers as a refuge from the noise of the city and factory. Hunting, camping,
and fishing were seen as truly working class pastimes that ought to be preserved through
careful government planning of parks and preservation of wild rivers. But despite their
defense of the national parks, they still included Glacier View on a map of potential
dams.35
While not all versions of CVA displayed the environmental consciousness of
Magnificent Columbia, even the more development focused promoters saw the
Administration as an opportunity to move beyond the extractive model of the past. The
League for CVA distributed their own pamphlet with more classic development themes
featuring images of miners, ranchers, and lumbermen. Yet in the document they
advocated for an end to the “cut and get out tradition.” They claimed that “this area will
be richer than ever before and it will be more like it used to be in the days when the
Indians roamed and the fish leaped in every river and the deer were found on every hill
and in every valley.”36 The Department of the Interior also endorsed the Columbia Valley
Administration with Secretary Julius Krug declaring CVA the best mechanism for both,
“maximum development and wise use of Columbia Basin resources.” Krug welcomed the
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prospect of handing over Interior Department projects to a CVA stating “I think they will
do better work and be of more value to the people of the Columbia Basin states as part of
an integrated, regional, at-home administration with its headquarters in the Pacific
Northwest.” Despite the endorsement, Secretary Krug’s statement made clear that no
authorized project was to be canceled, including the navigation dams on the Lower Snake
River.37 In Krug’s testimony before the Senate Public Works Committee, he clarified
further why he believed in CVA citing the strong protections for laborers and Indian
Reservations in the bill.38 However, despite Krug’s insistence that Native Americans
would be protected by CVA, the primary topic of discussion regarding the reservations
during a 1949 congressional hearing was how CVA could speed up the process of mining
phosphate rock on tribal land.39
Yet despite the support of labor unions, federal agencies, and President Truman, no CVA
bill was ever passed. The opposition which had rallied against the MVA fought even harder
against the CVA, and in the process laid the groundwork for a full-scale rejection of the public
power vision of the New Deal. Republicans and state’s rights Democrats campaigned against
river valley authorities but continued to support federal engineering of rivers.40 Without
questioning the role that the Army Corps of Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation had to play in
creating shipping channels and providing irrigation water, they insisted that the federal
government hand over control of the power market to private companies. Historian Elmo
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Richardson assessed the flaws of that model writing: “Although they insisted that they were
defending private enterprise and democracy, such a policy in fact would mean that a few local
monopolists would reap the benefits of highly profitable projects financed by the taxes of the
entire population.”41
The private power interests had their own claims to unfairness rooted in the preference
BPA gave to utility cooperatives and the fact that federal power projects were exempt from
taxation. Consulting engineer Thomas Robins made just such an argument at a meeting of a
utility trades group in Spokane in 1948. Robins argued that the misguided wording and
ideologically motivated interpretation of all major water power legislation had not allowed for
“fair dealing and due regard to economics.” The preference for public customers was seen as an
unjust inequality based on what valley one happened to live and do business in. He concluded his
remarks with a call for new overarching water power legislation that would give the same price
to all customers, regardless of their business model, stating: “it should be made certain that the
proceeds from the sale of power get back into the national treasury instead of being squandered
on ideologies… there is no doubt in my mind that our system of free enterprise is doomed unless
something is done without delay.”42
Depending on which newspaper one read, they may have been convinced that CVA was
the next step toward perfecting human civilization or the next step on the road to serfdom. While
labor friendly papers ran front page stories extolling the virtues of river valley authorities, the
Anaconda and Montana Power Company aligned press ran stories comparing valley authorities
to all shapes of totalitarianism. Following a meeting of the Upper Columbia Development
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Association in Missoula, the Daily Missoulian equated the opinion of that organization with half
of the state, reporting that “West Montanans Oppose CVA as Dictatorial” describing an
“unswerving opposition to the principle of valley authorities.”43 Lewie Williams, president of the
West Coast Mineral Association wrote in a letter to the Seattle Post Intelligencer thanking them
for their coverage of the CVA debate that, “No one who believes in our republican form of
government will support such socialistic and totalitarian ideas if fully informed.” 44 In the
margins of an article describing the creeping socialism of the UK Labor Party, Walter H.
McLeod, the owner of Missoula Mercantile and a board member of the Montana Power
Company wrote of CVA supporters like James Murray, that “public-ownership-socialistcollectivist leaders” sell their valley authority ideas to common people by promising lower
prices, while forcing people to pay “through increased taxes and through loss of freedom.”
Setting his sights on public power, McLeod quoted David Lilienthal’s own words “Those who
control energy, control people” fearing government control of the people through energy, while
dismissing the critique that the line’s original author had been aiming at men like McLeod. 45
Not all who opposed the CVA, and valley authority plans generally, shared the
vocabulary of Jack D. Ripper and the John Birch Society.46 Many who fought the creation of
river basin agencies opposed the general principle of federally directed regional development. In
his testimony against H.R. 4286–7, Montana State University law professor J. Howard Toelie
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challenged the claims to rational and efficient governance posited by proponents of valley
authorities. He argued that the water law as it existed in the West, with three separate systems
reflecting the aridity of the land—riparian doctrine in wetter states, prior appropriation in dryer
states, and a combination of the two in transitional states—already reflected a development
focused regionalism. In addition to the problem authorities would face working across separate
legal systems, he contested the development goals envisioned by the CIO. Pointing to the
example of the Big Thompson project in Colorado, Toelie argued that inter-basin water transfer
was convenient, as was the transfer of electrical power over long distances in order that it “may
find its best market in the industrialized urban area of another basin.” In his view, the
government was trying to solve a legal problem that was already resolved by local interests
generations earlier, while sabotaging the full use of technology to resolve the accidents of
geography. On the latter point he far oversimplified what had been and would continue to be a
monumental undertaking for both engineers and politicians.47
While organized labor was generally on the side of public power, there were some
notable exceptions. The more conservative Utility Workers Union of America-CIO—the first
CIO member to ban communists—saw many locals defect from the national organization when it
came to river valley authorities and public electricity generally. Utility Workers Local 270 of
Cleveland protested a TVA steam plant on March 3, 1949, stating: “the construction of a steam
generating plant by the government is a direct intervention in the electric utility industry and
contrary to the American way of thinking.” Local 175 of Dayton, Ohio, joined them, describing
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the proposed plant as “going a little too far towards socialism.” The UWUA Locals were not
opposed to power dams outright, as hydroelectricity was merely an advantage of building multiuse infrastructure, but a standalone power plant went beyond the theoretical bounds of American
governance.48 The AFL’s IBEW Local 1245 of Vacaville CA passed a preemptive resolution
against the government taking ownership of Pacific Gas and Electric in May 1948.49 Granges
throughout the West were likewise split over expanding public electricity.50 The Oregon Grange
strongly supported a CVA, especially after the 1948 floods, while the Idaho Grange and the
Lower Valley Grange of Flathead County, Montana voted unanimously on a resolution opposing
CVA. Calling the plan “democracy in retreat,” The Lower Valley Grange resolution went so far
as to speculate that the president would not choose westerners to head the CVA and thus the
three member board would not be familiar enough with western water law to make good
decisions.51 Montana’s Grange Master Winton Weydemeyer, who had caught the attention of
every possible camp when he testified against Glacier View Dam at a 1948 hearing in Missoula,
opposed the CVA and fought against public power throughout his life, becoming a significant
voice for environmental protection and conservative politics throughout the 1950s and 60s. 52 In
January of 1950 he wrote a detailed letter to the editors of Nature Magazine responding to their
arguments in favor of CVA. Weydemeyer characterized the views of the Nature Magazine
editorial as being essentially reactionary, that their argument came down to: “If the damned

“CIO Unit Wants ‘Progressive Capitalism’” Dayton Daily News, February 12, 1949 clipping found in Harry
Billings Montana Power Collection (HBM), box 1, folder 1.
49
HBM, box 1, folder 1.
50
Granges are farmers organizations similar to labor unions with thousands of local granges throughout the country.
51
“Floods and a CVA” Oregon Grange Bulletin, June 7, 1948, “Grange Opposes CVA by Unanimous Vote” date
and publication unknown, clipping in PMP, box 13, folder 6.
52
Weydemeyer’s testimony garnered the attention of wilderness advocates, Republican state politicians, the
Montana Power Company, and Montana’s Congressmen; Transcripts of the testimony can be found in CMP, series
2, box 3, folder 12.
48

65

power interests are ag’in it, I’m all for it.”53 He warned that knee jerk opposition to the power
companies had led his fellow conservationists to blindly support a plan that amounted to nothing
more than wishful thinking. The federal government was already unresponsive to the people on
resource issues, rearranging their authority and handing power to a new set of administrators
wasn’t going to change that. He argued against the notion—which he attributed to Theodore
Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot—that public ownership was always the best means of
conservation, writing that it was, “high time we realize that programs of conservation-for-use can
never be adequately successful if applied primarily as government programs devised by the
planners and dictated to our citizens—even if Congress approves.”54
Members of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes rarely weighed in on the debate
over valley authorities. For many native people in both the Columbia and Missouri watersheds
dams were an outside imposition which could only do harm. The Spokane, Okanogan, and Coeur
d’Alene tribes had all had their primary food source eradicated by the construction of Grand
Coulee Dam in 1942. The Yakama, Umatilla, Warm Springs, Nez Perce, and Palouse witnessed
once great salmon, steelhead, and lamprey runs steadily diminish with each addition to the
Columbia Power System.55 George Gillette, chairman of the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara tribes
of the Fort Berthold Reservation could not hold back tears as he watched Julius Krug sign away
his people’s land beneath the waters of Lake Sakakawea.56 The Crow Tribe saw what little
monetary compensation they were granted for land flooded by Yellowtail Dam cut in half twice
without their consent.57 By and for whom hydropower was being generated was not a primary
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concern among those who were certain it was not for them. However, among the Salish and
Kootenai there was one tribal council member who was greatly concerned about the possibility
of a Columbia Valley Administration. Lorena Burgess, first woman to serve on the CSKT
council, had a regular correspondence with Governor John Bonner in 1949 in which she insisted
that he oppose the CVA bills. Her letters were biting in their criticism of the West’s lone
Democrat governor. “I admit you wrote a nice letter, but am I to think as others think that you at
heart are a CVA man?” she asked in one. She went on to accuse Bonner of not having read the
bill before writing, “I realize this is still America and every one is entitled to their own opinion,
some of us are loyal to our friends…” Bonner took the criticism silently, only replying that he
had not yet decided his position on CVA. While Burgess’ anti-CVA position is noteworthy, she
cannot be considered to represent the position of her whole tribe, who have left few records
regarding their thoughts on the matter.58
Historians have given several explanations for the failure of CVA under Truman. Spritzer
blamed Truman’s lackluster leadership. Clayton Koppes claimed that under Truman’s Fair Deal,
“corporate liberalism” replaced “commonwealth liberalism” as the guiding administrative
ideology, dooming redistributive projects like valley authorities. 59 Richardson argued that
western Democrats failed to rally enough support from Eastern and Midwest Congressmen. 60
Mark Reisner, while not directly writing about CVA, theorized that the intensely local issue of
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water development legislation is the “grease gun that lubricates the nation’s legislature” a theory
which supports Richardson’s argument.61 Historians David P. Billington, Donald C. Jackson, and
Martin V. Melosi in their official history of hydropower for the Department of the Interior cited
fear—fear for the future of democracy and free enterprise—as the primary cause of CVA’s
defeat.62 Each of these explanations has truth to it, but each also lacks something. Those who
point to fear are correct, but that explanation does not address who stoked those fears. Truman
and Krug lacked the will and political prowess of Roosevelt and Ickes, but to focus solely on
their failure ignores those who tested their will and organized against them. Likewise,
emphasizing the eastern and midwestern representatives who did not support western water
projects is lacking without addressing the national publications which encouraged those
representatives to question the costs of western water projects. The failure of CVA can only be
understood by drawing attention to the coalition of business interests who harnessed the fear of
communism to prevent the expansion of state power that had begun with the New Deal. Chief
among them in Montana were the Montana Power Company, the Anaconda Mining Company,
and the Northern Pacific Railroad, all companies that had built their wealth in the heyday of
extractive industry. In their successful campaign against the creation of another TVA they
unintentionally gave a voice to conservationists like Winton Weydemeyer who questioned both
public and private development, a phenomenon that will be discussed in the next chapter.
The dream of coordinated development had begun to fade by the time Truman left office.
Adlai Stevenson made no mention of CVA during the 1952 campaign and went so far as to agree
with Eisenhower that the TVA model was perhaps not the right one for other river basins. 63
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Progressive Democrats like James Murray had tried and failed to expand the public power legacy
of the New Deal in the Truman years. After nineteen years of success, public power was on the
defensive, but not defeated. Mike Mansfield beat Zales Ecton in the 1952 senate race even while
Eisenhower carried the state by more than nineteen percent. Mansfield won while making a firm
stand in defense of public power, citing his own record on Hungry Horse Dam throughout the
campaign.64 At the dedication of Hungry Horse Dam just a month before the election, President
Truman warned that it would be a long time before another such project would be built if Ike
won the election, stating that “Just as we have created this dam to better regulate the
management of water resources and power we need to in our government regulate power and
resources” and that we “should be wary of turning the government over to special interest and
money men” who he saw as the power behind the Republican Party.65 But with Eisenhower’s
inauguration in 1953, the private utilities and their newly invigorated grassroots support would
have their opportunity to gain ground in the western power market, and they would make their
next stand on the Oregon-Idaho border beneath the peaks of the Seven Devils range.
The Hells Canyon High Dam controversy was perhaps the most significant natural
resource issue of the Eisenhower years. Historian Ken Boyd Brooks wrote in his definitive
account of the ordeal Public Power, Private Dams, that Hells Canyon determined the future of
the western electrical and political landscape: “Had the federal government built Hells Canyon
High Dam, publicly owned electricity would have captured the nation’s greatest untapped
hydroelectric resource. Instead, a small private power company received a limited license to
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manage a small portion of the Snake’s total potential power.”66 The symbolic significance of
Hells Canyon to the Republican Party was immediately apparent in 1952, as Eisenhower’s first
campaign stop after receiving his party’s nomination was in Boise, Idaho where the decorated
general played to the Mountain West’s frustrations with the New Deal legacy. In his Boise
speech, Eisenhower declared his intent to replace the “federal monopoly over power” with a
system of “regulated power” in which the federal government would operate as a “cooperating
partner where this seems necessary or desirable.”67
To achieve his vision of public-private power partnership, Eisenhower staffed the
agencies in charge of public power in the Interior Department with friends of private electricity,
nominating former Oregon Governor Douglas McKay as Secretary. Douglas McKay was known
for his “folksy phrases, platitudes” and was known to “to overuse the label ‘socialist.’” He had
received praise from Thomas Dewey upon his selection for Interior Secretary: “I am looking
forward with great happiness to the wonderful job I know you will do in slaying the Socialist
dragon of the Interior Department.”68 Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff deemed McKay to be the most
conservative member of the Republican cabinet. Upon his ascension to Interior, the New York
Times declared “the end of an era of active government involvement in the development of the
country’s natural resources.”69 As Governor, McKay had testified passionately against the CVA
which he termed an “autocratic Federal corporation… which is dangerously similar to the
devices of a totalitarian state” warning that attempts to simplify governance were akin to taking a
short cut, but “the short cut never leads back to the trail.”70 McKay, reflecting on his first year as
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Secretary, attempted to sooth the fears of his critics, stating “I do not agree with some views that
the federal government should pull out to the power business entirely.”71 BPA administrator Paul
Raver broke from the consensus of his erstwhile colleagues and praised Eisenhower’s selection
of McKay in a statement which a Flathead Courier columnist saw as yet another example of the
duplicitous nature of government power administrators.72 Still, most politicians and
commentators saw McKay’s appointment as a sea change in natural resource policy which would
have immediate consequences, particularly with regard to licensing dams in the West.
Since at least as early as 1947, federal planners had been pushing for a single high dam
on the Snake River at Hells Canyon “in order to permit this Department to achieve the goal of
the fullest economic development of the Pacific Northwest.”73 The plan was to utilize Hells
Canyon power to process phosphates for fertilizer and power irrigation pumps to water the
Reclamation Bureau’s Mountain Home Project on the plains east of Boise. Truman had
campaigned across the Northwest in 1948 promising to repeat the success of Grand Coulee in the
upper basin with a High Dam on the Snake. In 1950 however, the Hells Canyon bill failed to
pass the Senate. Seeing a weakness in public power's grip on the Columbia Basin, the Idaho
Power Company applied to the Federal Power Commission in December 1950 for authorization
to construct the much smaller Oxbow Dam in the same stretch of river. Power company lawyers
and bureaucrats at Interior kept the application and any new High Dam bills tied up in the courts
and at the FPC for years. With Eisenhower’s appointment of McKay to Interior, Idaho Power
doubled down on their plan for the Snake, filing two further applications for dams above and
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below Oxbow. In 1955, Idaho Power was granted authorization for a three-dam complex and set
to work constructing Brownlee Dam with Oxbow soon to follow.74
Even as concrete was being poured at Brownlee, public power advocates continued to
keep the High Dam dream alive, but bill after bill was voted down. On July 11, 1957 The
Flathead Courier ran two articles side by side headlined “Hell’s Canyon [sic] Farce is Over” and
“Paradise Dam Farce Continues.” The first article, reprinted from the Spokesman Review,
confidently declared that “it was inevitable that the Hells Canyon bill could not become law”
despite the effort of “public ownership zealots” bent on “advancing their program for a welfare
state in which private enterprise would be supplanted by socialism.”75 But that second article
indicated that the confident proclamation of public power’s defeat was perhaps premature, as the
Paradise Dam, a once defeated dam, arose once more as a live option.
With the Hells Canyon High Dam defeated for the last time in 1957, public power
interests turned to Montana’s Clark Fork River as the last best hope for expanding federal control
of electricity. Just five miles downstream from its confluence with the Flathead, the Clark Fork
River flows calmly between the Pritchard Formation cliffs that separate the towns of Paradise
and Plains.76 The canyon is not imposing in either width or depth and was not difficult to access
with heavy machinery like the sites proposed on the wild North and Middle Forks of the Flathead
at Glacier View and Spruce Park. Anchoring a 243-foot-high concrete dam in the rocky cliffs,
Army engineers could fill a reservoir all the way back to the base of Kerr Dam at the mouth of
Flathead Lake and eight miles upstream from the town of Superior on the Clark Fork. Because of
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the steady grade of both Clark Fork and Flathead upstream from the site, studies suggested that
Paradise Dam was projected to produce four times as much electricity as Hungry Horse despite
being only half of its height. This 66,000-acre reservoir would add over a million kilowatts of
generating capacity to the Columbia hydropower system, while supplementing downstream
generation by regulating flows. “Rare indeed is the opportunity to control two rivers with one
dam!” promotional flyers proudly proclaimed.77
In the fight over Paradise Dam, both public power advocates and private interests formed
nonprofit organizations, brought in high profile speakers, and mailed pamphlets all over the
region. By the early 1960s, the Montana Power Company was spending $25,000 each year on ad
campaigns opposing Paradise Dam.78 They did so primarily through a nonprofit organization
called the Upper Columbia Development Council (UCDC). This Missoula based outfit traced its
roots to the citizens organized to fight the 1937 proposal to raise the level of Flathead Lake and
had reformed under the UCDC name in 1957 when hearings were called for the Paradise Dam.
In the 1940s UCDC members had organized successfully against the Glacier View Dam and the
Paradise Dam and sent expert witnesses to testify in Congress against MVA and CVA. 79 In the
1950s, they sent out mailers and bought ads in western Montana Newspapers detailing the
drawbacks, not just of Paradise Dam, but of large storage reservoirs in general in what
Congressman Lee Metcalf called an “oratorical flood submerging facts” in a 1962 article for
Public Power.80 In their fundraising materials the UCDC explicitly placed themselves in
opposition to the “exponents of the philosophy of public ownership of the means of production”
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and in favor of, “the Free Enterprise system under which we have grown and prospered.”81 Miles
Romney of Hamilton, Montana, complained about the influence Montana Power was having
through the newspapers in a 1963 editorial for Western News. He blamed the outpouring of
articles critical of federal dams on the “carpetbaggers” at Lee Enterprises who bought seven
Montana newspapers from the Anaconda Company in 1959. UCDC leaders responded writing
that the authors of the editorials were from Montana, and thus not “carpetbaggers,” asking if Mr.
Romney would prefer the copper company go back to controlling the press. The UCDC were
right about the fact that editorials were coming from Montanans, but considering the funding that
UCDC received through Montana Power, in a roundabout way copper money was still
controlling what got printed in the state’s major newspapers.82
Despite their funding source, UCDC members were not simply puppets of the Montana
Power Company, they were true believers in alternative approaches to water conservation and
the supremacy of “the free enterprise system.”83 Their newsletter was filled with alternate dam
proposals, appeals to reduce the size of government, and warnings about the ever-present threat
of communism. Council president Ray Loman wrote in an August 1963 Newsletter that
centralized government “by its nature is dictatorial and not concerned with the rights and dignity
of the individual man.” A November 1957 newsletter carried an article about the REA which
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warned of “the threat of a socialist, federally-owned power system” and the December 1959
newsletter carried a cartoon entitled “first lesson in economics” in which a worker is mocked for
suggesting that labor is entitled to a share of corporate profits.84 The UCDC recruited members
from the state Republican Party, even coaching Republican governor Hugo J. Aronson ahead of a
speech in Missoula in October 1957.85
By contrast, the Committee for Paradise Dam—the inverse organization of the UCDC—
sponsored talks and published pamphlets extolling the virtues of public ownership of the means
of electricity production. The Committee’s 800–1,160 members were primarily residents of
Plains, Charlo, Hot Springs, and Missoula, Montana with ties to organized labor and the
Democratic Party. The Committee’s official stationary in the 1950s carried the phrase “The Hells
Canyon of Montana” across the bottom, clearly indicating how important they saw Paradise for
the future of public power.86 They organized letter writing campaigns, sent out mailers, and
brought speakers to Missoula including Northwest Public Power Association executive secretary
Gus Norwood and Special Council to the Senate Interior Committee Milton C. Mapes Jr. 87
Mapes and Norwood laid out their defense of Paradise Dam in the context of a long struggle for
public control of utilities that began with Gifford Pinchot.88 In a 1958 address to an audience of
Montana Farmer Labor Institute in Missoula, Milton C. Mapes argued that if the United States
failed to expand public power, it did not deserve the title of civilization and asserted that creating
new TVAs around the world would be “our generation’s acid test of our belief in the Golden
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Rule.” Mapes echoed Pinchot’s concerns about the power of private utilities to subvert
democracy. “Think for a moment of the economic and political power concentrated in an
industry… with a $100-billion annual gross income, and with its employees in every hamlet,
town and city in the country!” Mapes warned.89 While channeling Pinchot, Mapes’ line of
reasoning also mirrored that of the anticommunists, warning of a network of agents acting on
behalf of an outside power to subvert democracy at all levels.
Anaconda may have owned the major newspapers, but The Committee for Paradise Dam
had their own allies in publishing, particularly Harry Billings, editor of the Helena based farmerlabor newspaper The People’s Voice. Billings was the son of a lumberman from Hot Springs,
Montana, a small town on the Flathead Reservation uphill from the proposed banks of Paradise
Lake. His wife Gretchen’s family had homesteaded in Plains, Montana, not far from the Paradise
damsite. The Billingses had a long history of support for public power and a long-standing
conflict with the MPC. The People’s Voice published dozens of articles about Hells Canyon,
Yellowtail, Glacier View, and Hungry Horse, but most of all, Paradise Dam. In addition to
journalism about the progress of dam construction or committee hearings on future projects, The
People’s Voice ran articles extolling the benefits of public power. Harry Billings also organized
rallies at the Montana Power offices in Helena to protest natural gas rates and wrote several
investigative pieces sifting through the stock dealings and tax records of the company. Billings
expressed his contempt for private utilities in a radio broadcast on Helena’s KCAP in March
1957, stating that while he understood the tendency of private companies to seek maximum
profit; he did not understand the failure, “of the public officials to resist when those tendencies
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collide with the general public welfare.” In Billings’ view, Montana Power was not solely
responsible for their price gouging, so long as legislators failed to rein them in.90
What constitutes the “public interest” has always been a matter of debate, especially
when it comes to electricity marketing. In the post-New Deal period, Montana Democrats
continued to air their grievances with private utilities for overcharging customers, stymying
development, and sowing doubt about the role of state agencies in providing for the public good.
In 1951, Montana Agricultural Commissioner Alfred R. Anderson, addressing the Richland
County REA, extolled the progress he had witnessed in his lifetime before turning his attention
to the private utilities. Anderson expressed his “contempt for segments of that group who would
seek to monopolize for their own selfish interests, against the interest of the people and nation,”
to “deny the people the full enjoyment of one of the greatest blessings God has bestowed upon
Montana—abundant hydroelectric potentials.”91 For Anderson and many others like him, the
“public interest” which had guided federal policy during the New Deal and World War II,
required the full development of resources through federal planning. He feared that by the
second Truman administration, full development for the benefit of everyone was no longer
guiding principle of leaders in Washington.
At a meeting of the Kiwanis Club of Helena in 1965, Brit Englund, a longtime assistant
to then Senator Lee Metcalf, delivered an impassioned speech on the magnitude of the private
electricity threat.92 He opened his address with an obligatory call to fight Soviet communism, an
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appeal to a common enemy intended to galvanize his audience’s sense of a common interest. In
the speech he laid out the contours of a domestic force which was undermining the capacity to
fight the external Soviet threat. For Englund, this pervasive domestic threat was the media
network set up by the executives of private utilities and former members of the Eisenhower
administration with ties to the John Birch Society. This shadowy network of free market
fundamentalists utilized the rhetoric of anticommunism and taxpayer advocacy to sow doubts
about the government’s ability to regulate markets in the public interest. Chief among these
nefarious actors, Englund argued, were Clarence Manion and Edward Vennard. Manion had
been fired by Eisenhower for disrespecting Alen Dulles and suggesting that the TVA be sold off.
Vennard managed the Edison Electric Institute, a trade association of investor-owned electric
utilities. Together Vennard and Manion created the Manion Forum, a talk radio program carried
by over 250 stations which broadcast claims that the “socialistic planners'' at the FPC, BPA, and
TVA had set their sights on eliminating “private property and private enterprise.” 93 While tarring
all public power advocates from the local co-op board to Senator Metcalf as agents of
Khrushchev, Manion Forum programs touted private electric utilities as “the largest taxpayers in
the country” and routinely compared their businesses to independent retailers, despite the
obvious differences between a Main Street grocer and an electrical utility.94
Brit Englund closed his speech with an appeal to unity and a defense of planning. “We
are partners in competition with the Soviet Union. We are partners in the orderly development,
wise management and highest possible use of our resources,” he argued, “it is high time we
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stopped trying to out each other up—and got back to partnership in our best interest.” 95
Anderson, Englund, and Billings, along with Mansfield, Murray, and Metcalf, all appealed to a
fading sense of a unified public interest. They highlighted a larger trend in American political
culture that Ira Katznelson and others have illustrated. Katznelson wrote in Fear Itself about the
loss of a singular public interest in the aftermath of the New Deal and World War II, replaced
instead by the competition between various private interests to gain support from a theoretically
impartial, procedural state.96 The dream of seven little TVAs and of public power generally was
indelibly tied up in that vanishing consensus, and was disappearing along with it.97 That was
what the public power lobby saw as the lesson of Hells Canyon and what they were beginning to
see in their efforts to get Paradise Dam built in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Comprehensive
development in the public interest, which had been the dream of the Roosevelt years, was being
replaced by ad hoc private development sanctioned by the FPC and later FERC. Public Power’s
moment in the sun was quickly fading. Private Power’s claim to the public interest, however,
was also peaking. Soon both would be challenged by a rising interest opposed to development of
all kinds. This amenity-based lifestyle interest manifested through tourism, recreation, and
ecological preservation in many ways represented the same ideals as those expressed in
Magnificent Columbia. However, rather than a river valley authority, they sought to create a
legal regime for the preservation of wilderness and scenic rivers.
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Chapter Three:
Preserving Paradise: The Buffalo Rapids Controversy

While the battle lines of national debate over energy development had been drawn
between free enterprise and federal planning, local conditions and desires made for more
complicated alignments when it came to proposed dams in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In the
wake of the Hells Canyon High Dam fight, local boosters, Native American leaders, traditional
conservationists, and wilderness advocates clashed over the fate of Montana’s Clark Fork basin.
Competing proposals for how and whether or not to dam the Clark Fork and Flathead Rivers
realigned the political landscape of western Montana, at the same time that national economic,
legal, and ideological shifts changed the dam building calculus.
Initial studies of the hydroelectric potential of the Lower Flathead River between the
mouth of Flathead Lake and the confluence with the Clark Fork near Paradise, Montana
identified five viable damsites. Of these, only the site closest to Flathead Lake—the site of Kerr
Dam—was developed, as discussed in Chapter 1. Where the wild river remained, especially at
the sites identified as Buffalo Rapids #2 and #4, both Montana Power and the Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes (CSKT) held out for the possibility of one day constructing run of
river dams to supply power to businesses in Polson and the irrigation pumps of surrounding
farms. These reserved sites were threatened by the proposal from the Army Corp of Engineers to
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build a high dam at Paradise impounding both Clark Fork and Flathead valleys up to the Trout
Creek lumber mill on the Clark Fork and the base of Kerr Dam on the Flathead.
In the 1940s, debate over damming Paradise arose entangled with the politics of
preservation surrounding the Glacier View Dam. This saga forms the core of Shawn P. Bailey’s
dissertation “Worth A Dam”. According to Bailey, calls for the Paradise Dam arose from groups
nationwide opposed to development within the national parks. 1 Seeing some power development
as both necessary and inevitable, entities such as the Sierra Club petitioned Congress to
reconsider the plan for a dam on the North Fork of the Flathead which would flood a portion of
Glacier National Park, instead emphasizing alternative projects. In 1949 Sierra Club President
Lewis F. Clark proposed a dam on the Middle Fork of the Flathead at Spruce Park as the best
alternative to Glacier View, but this option both upset local wildlife advocates and failed to
measure up to the kilowatts demanded by the hydropower lobby.2 When environmental groups
then offered up Paradise as a worthy trade to preserve the upstream wilderness, Mike Mansfield
was not receptive to their argument. Mansfield saw himself as the elected representative of the
people first and the land second. Because of Mansfield’s commitment to preserve communities
before preserving wilderness, CSKT leaders worked with the Congressman to promote his
Glacier View bills in 1949 and throughout the 1950s.3 According to Bailey, CSKT “supported
the construction of the Glacier View Dam, not for the promise of cheap hydroelectric power,
economic development, or flood control,” but rather, “because the construction of a dam that
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ruined the remote wilderness of Glacier National Park would preempt the destruction of their
treaty-protected homeland.”4 They argued that Glacier View was the fiscally responsible option,
as the land to be flooded was already the possession of the United States and thus no private land
holders would need to be bought out.5 Ultimately, the 1949 push for the construction of Paradise
Dam ended with a handshake and a joint memorandum signaling an uneasy alliance between the
Interior Department and the Army Corp of Engineers as Julius Krug and Keneth Royall informed
the president that neither of their offices would pursue the Paradise or Glacier View dams.6
In the years following the 1949 defeat of Paradise and Glacier View, increasing power
demand meant that no project could stay defeated forever. Initial needs to put servicemen back to
work domestically and power the growing suburbs filled with new electrical appliances was met
by the completion of dams throughout the Columbia and Missouri basins, including Hungry
Horse Dam on the South Fork of the Flathead in 1953. Yet in the high energy economy of the
post war era, demand continued to grow. Before the Columbia Falls aluminum smelter was even
constructed, metals companies were lobbying for another dam in the Upper Flathead to expand
the plant.7 Throughout the 1950s, Flathead County boosters continued to raise the possibility of
constructing Glacier View, a project which Mike Mansfield had never quite abandoned. For
Montana’s other Congressmen, Paradise became the preferred project. In particular,
Congressman Lee Metcalf took up the torch of public power promotion with Paradise topping his
list of favored sites.
In the late 1950s, as Lee Metcalf became a reliable ally of the wilderness movement, his
position on federal dams in the Flathead Basin became a matter of some controversy. In 1955,
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labor organizations in Flathead County circulated a petition to Montana’s Congressional
Delegation asking them to revive calls for the Glacier View Dam. Mike Mansfield reaffirmed his
unconditional support for the dam believing it to be a boon for both industry and tourism in the
region, but Lee Metcalf was not as committed.8 Metcalf insisted that while he believed the region
could use more hydropower to spur economic growth, the Glacier View Dam was a losing battle,
especially in the wake of the Echo Park Dam controversy in Utah’s Dinosaur National
Monument. The fight to save Dinosaur from a dam—which Metcalf had taken part in—had
turned national attention to the potential encroachment of industrial development on the National
Park System. Outcry from around the country resulted in Congress explicitly stipulating that no
part of the Colorado River Storage Project would be located within National Parks or
Monuments.9 In Metcalf’s view, staking hopes for a new dam in western Montana on a once
defeated proposal that threatened the sanctity of Glacier National Park would only bring
disappointment and further erode the political will for federal hydropower. He advised instead
that public power advocates seek authorization for the dams at Paradise, rather than reigniting
the Glacier View controversy.10
As the Paradise Dam once again became the primary objective of the public power
movement in Montana, people living in the footprint of the potential reservoir pressed their
Congressmen to reconsider. Letters from farmers, orchardists, and railroad workers in Paradise,
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St. Regis, and Superior, Montana, seemed to have an effect on their legislators over time, as the
Paradise Dam proposal steadily became the Paradise-Knowles proposal and simply Knowles by
1962. The Knowles plan shifted the damsite five miles to the east, such that the dam would
impound only the Flathead and not the Clark Fork River, sparing the most populous towns and
the main highway to Missoula.11 While a significant reduction in potential kilowatts and flood
control, the Knowles Dam would nonetheless have been an enormous hydropower project
capable of producing 267 MW of prime power.12 The site change was enough to win over the
support of Mike Mansfield, who joined with Metcalf in support of the dam. However, the
railroad lines, the National Bison Range, the Flathead Reservation, and the Buffalo Rapids sites
were still in the flood path of the public power vision.
Advocates of Paradise generally employed the rhetoric of power for all, drawing a
throughline from Pinchot’s fight against the National Electric Light Association through
Roosevelt and Lilienthal’s TVA to their contemporary fight for expanding BPA in Montana.
Opposition, as discussed in the previous chapter, tended to employ McCarthyite fears of
socialism in the energy market as a counter to any and all public projects. The false binary
employed by newspapers and trade associations created two distinct camps that paradoxically
allowed room for novel arguments to be made. Seeking any and all help to prevent the expansion
of a federal energy monopoly, the private electricity industry welcomed the voices of
environmentalists who challenged the federal government on ecological grounds. Public Utilities
Fortnightly, the trade journal of the electrical industry, shared the thoughts of Wilderness Society
member and later director of the Izaak Walton League Olaus Murie, along with members of the
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National Wildlife Federation who decried the “great race to bury the Northwest in concrete.”13 In
the lower Columbia Basin where salmon and steelhead trout still migrated to their spawning
streams, ecological opposition to federal dams focused primarily on their role in destroying the
salmon industry.14 Historian Karl Boyd Brooks argued that in their effort to protect their industry
against competition from low cost federal hydropower, the private utilities played a role in the
formation of the modern environmental movement by arousing, “citizens' interest in the cost,
control, and consequences of natural resource development.”15
In Montana, the Upper Columbia Development Council was among those capitalizing on
the public’s skepticism of federal resource management, advancing a novel theory of river
development. Anticommunist rhetoric could rile up Montanans skeptical of federal engineers,
but it did not resolve the persistent problems of flooding, rising power demand, and the need for
a steady supply of irrigation water. To address these, the UCDC put together a plan so ambitious
in scope that it rivaled the schemes of the public power lobby. The “Common Sense Flood
Control Plan” proposed constructing 193 small dams in the headwaters of the Clark Fork, with
50 dams planned for the Blackfoot basin alone. The UCDC theory of “Common Sense” flood
control, water conservation, and power development was meant to have a smaller impact on
wildlife and existing infrastructure by dispersing those impacts across the basin rather than
concentrating all of them in one large reservoir. These smaller dams would theoretically provide
flood control at the source, protecting upstream communities as well as those along the main
river channel. Pamphlets promoting the plan argued that upstream dams would save on power by
providing irrigation water without the need for uphill pumping, and would cause minimal
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destruction of trout, eagle, and elk habitat. These benefits, however, would only accrue once a
significant number of upstream dams had been built. Pieces of the headwaters scheme already
existed in the form of irrigation diversion dams such as the Nevada Creek dam south of Lincoln
and the Rattlesnake Dam in Missoula, but in 1957 when the plan was published, the vast
majority of the creeks designated for damming still ran free.16 On their own, each undeveloped
creek represented a flood risk and a waste of potential water and power. Whereas a large dam
like Paradise would achieve its power and irrigation aims in a single action, the headwaters
scheme required the coordination of several local conservation boards and irrigation districts
across ten counties. UCDC reframed this challenge as a benefit of their program, arguing that it
would put water policy in the hands of local governments, rather than far off planners in Helena
and Washington D.C. While the likelihood of such widespread voluntary action being
undertaken was slim, Montana Power disseminated the concept far and wide, sowing doubts
about the wisdom of federal engineers.17
In addition to their arguments about conserving energy and encouraging local selfdetermination, the UCDC made an ecological case for their development scheme. They appealed
to anglers in their printed material and public testimony arguing that Paradise Dam would
substitute “rough fish for excellent fishing” on the Clark Fork and Flathead Rivers. The UCDC
also sounded the alarm on the threat that Paradise-Knowles posed to the national Bison Range
and the Flathead Reservation. Development Council pamphlets claimed that Paradise Dam
would flood over one third of the National Bison Range and 20,000 acres of treaty protected
CSKT land.18 Senator Metcalf questioned the accuracy of those figures, citing reports produced
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by the U.S Fish and Wildlife Service and the Army Corps of Engineers which claimed only
10.8% of the Bison Range would be flooded. Metcalf argued that the flooded Bison Range could
be replaced by the purchase of additional acreage, the cost and location of which would be
included in appropriations for dam construction. While the UCDC may have been rounding up
and Metcalf rounding down, there is no question that a dam at Paradise-Knowles would certainly
have a negative impact on the bison, the fish, and the birds which enjoy the riparian habitat along
the free-flowing river. No land exchange could reverse that fact.19
The environmental arguments advanced by the UCDC were not merely opportunistic, but
the result of the passions and expertise of their members, which included respected
conservationists such as Winton Weydemeyer. Weydemeyer was a writer, a resident of Fortine,
Montana, a tree farmer, Master of the Montana Grange, a Republican legislator, and most of all,
a conservationist. Between 1923 and 1975, Weydemeyer published 81 articles on conservation
and in 1986 he published a book on wildlife photography titled Picture Taking in Glacier
National Park. He wrote articles in support of early versions of the Wilderness Act to protect the,
“last fragments of wilderness from the unheeding motor car.”20 As the master of the Montana
Grange, his opinion was seen to represent many of the state’s farmers. As a legislator he
represented the Kootenai Valley in Helena and served as a delegate to the 1972 constitutional
convention. When the Upper Columbia Development Council contacted him in 1957 to help with
their campaign against the Paradise Dam, it was his stature as a wildlife and water
conservationist that caught the group’s attention. Weydemeyer was selected by the executive
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committee of the UCDC to speak with Governor Aronson prior to the hearing in Missoula to
help the Republican governor compose his response to the dam proposal.21
Yet while the UCDC had hit upon significant ecological critiques of large federal dams,
their alternative proposal and ties to private electricity put them at odds with the nation’s leading
environmental organizations. The Common Sense plan called for small dams to be built in each
of the scenic valleys of the Bitterroot Mountains including the popular hiking destinations of
Blodgett and Kootenai Canyons. The Wilderness Society under the leadership of Howard
Zanihser, was seeking to include a large section of the Bitterroots among the first designated
wilderness areas, in part to stop the construction of dams of any size on the scenic creeks of the
range. As the wilderness bill progressed through congress and boundaries were being drawn,
irrigators’ plans for headwaters dams put them in conflict with the Forest Service and
preservationists. Each group petitioned Senator Metcalf with their own proposal for how the
Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness boundary ought to be drawn.22
The UCDC’s flood control plan is striking in its scope, but the more likely alternative to
Paradise-Knowles was Buffalo Rapids #2 and #4. In 1956, the Montana Power Company and the
Army Corps of Engineers began drilling to test the viability of the Buffalo Rapid’s sites. Not
long after the test drilling began, CSKT chair Walter McDonald expressed his mixed feelings
about the proceedings. While he was disappointed that the findings of test drilling had not been
shared with the tribes, he was optimistic about the Buffalo Rapids dams, writing “We need
industry on our reservation as well as income from our vast resources.”23 The tribes’ interest in
constructing the Buffalo Rapids dams was twofold: economic development on the reservation,
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and preventing Paradise-Knowles. Many Native people, while rejecting the federal plans to flood
20,000 acres of their reserved land, embraced modest hydropower projects as an engine of
economic development. This was the case with regard to resource management on the
reservation broadly. Members had not opposed all timber harvest, but rather opposed the fact that
Northern Pacific was making money hand over fist on Flathead timber while native lumbermen
were living in poverty.24 Members of the CSKT who hoped to benefit from timber, minerals, and
hydropower had fought against the implementation of roadless rules on tribal forests in the 1930s
and again against the wilderness bill of 1958.
Wilderness preservation as a coordinated national project began on Indian Reservations.
In the 1930s, under the direction of Bob Marshall, sixteen roadless areas were designated on
reservation land throughout the West, including a section of the Mission Mountains on the
Flathead Reservation.25 Indian Reservations were the testing ground for systematized wilderness
preservation largely due to Marshall himself. Marshall was a zealot for the sanctity of
wilderness. Having grown up in the crowded smog of New York in the early twentieth century,
he saw undeveloped places as a refuge from the noise and stress of industrial cities. Marshall
applied the social science lens of the Progressive Era to the more spiritual wilderness ethic of
previous generations, arguing that wild places were necessary for individual mental health as
well as to provide adventurous opportunities to young men who may otherwise be driven to lives
of crime. In addition to the social psychology of progressive reformers, Marshall adopted the
pro-democracy outlook of the New Deal to argue that the preservation of undeveloped land
constituted a minority right which ought to be protected against the majority interest in the
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comforts and conveniences of modern industrial life which threatened to eradicate the last of the
wild and dangerous. Yet for all of his insistence on the wilderness as a refuge for rugged
individuals to be free of the degradation of industrial society, Marshall was also an avowed
socialist who believed in the New Deal project of uplifting the common man through direct
government intervention into the economy. A leading forester, he was called to Washington DC
to manage the recreation plan for the Forest Service before being picked to head up the forestry
division of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Historian Paul Sutter critiqued Marshall’s approach to
wilderness preservation on the reservations, arguing that Marshall idealized the pre-industrial
economy of the tribes, mistaking, “tribalism for organic socialism; he assumed that Native
Americans were single minded avatars of his critique of modern America… offering his own
romantic conceptions of the best interests of native peoples instead of seeking a truly democratic
expression of native interests.”26
When a generation of preservationists steeped in the ideas of Marshall, Leopold, and
Muir sought to codify their love of the wilderness into federal law, they were met with
opposition from the tribal leadership. James Murray presided over a hearing held in Salt Lake
City on Nov 12, 1958, to discuss the proposed Wilderness Preservation bill introduced by
Representative John Saylor and Senator Hubert Humphry. Walter McDonald attended and
testified against the bill because it merely required that tribes be “consulted” when their lands
were considered for wilderness designation, not that the tribes give their consent. The Wilderness
Bill, in its early form, represented another step in the saga of dispossession of native American
lands. Whether for preservation or for extraction, the tribes did not want to lose sovereignty over
their rightful territory. When questioned about his reasoning prior to the hearing, McDonald
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stated that, “if this bill becomes law it will amount to abrogation of a sacred instrument, the 1855
treaty between the United States and the Flathead Indians,” but it was not merely the legal
question of who owned the land in the Mission Mountains on the eastern edge of the reservation
that turned McDonald against the wilderness bill, it was the idea of preservation itself. “We have
all joined hands in encouraging industrial development on all reservations, and certainly we do
not want any obstacles in the way.”27
The “messy pluralism” which Sutter argues was as much a feature of Native American
democracy as any other, continued to manifest in the 1950s and 60s. Varied positions and
changing views over time can be seen in the response of various members of the CSKT council
to the threat of termination and prospect of damming the Flathead River. For more than two
decades, council member Lorena Burgess organized against the Paradise Dam and public power
generally, while supporting tribal termination. Council chairman Walter McDonald fought
against termination while pursuing a development program based on the Buffalo Rapids dams. E.
W. Morigeau was open to the idea of termination while working with McDonald on the Buffalo
Rapids Dams. Kootenai elder and tribal council member Jerome Hewankorn went to great
lengths to oppose other tribal members on the Buffalo Rapids dams.
Termination was the legal process by which the federal government would end the
special trustee relationship that tribes held with the United States. The policy, which had been
considered for decades before its formal implementation in 1953, was a reversal of the selfdetermination policy which had followed the passage of the Wheeler-Howard Act in 1934 and a
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return to the assimilationist policies of the allotment era which had followed the Dawes Act of
1887. On July 27, 1953, Congress passed Resolution 108 which announced the termination
policy. Effective January 1, 1954, selected tribes including the Confederated tribes of the
Flathead Reservation were to submit an official roll of all their members so that the United States
government could make one final payment to each and end their trustee relationship. The policy
was seen by some in Congress—including Henry M. Jackson and Frank Church—to be about
civil equality. For others, access to the timber, power, and mineral resources of reserved lands
was the primary motive for ending trusteeship. This was the case in Secretary Douglas McKay’s
home state of Oregon where the Klamath, Siletz, and Grande Ronde Reservations were officially
terminated under the 1954 Western Oregon Indian Termination Act. Eliminating their
reservations made way for the logging of old growth forests in southeastern Oregon.28
Termination was a controversial issue among Native Americans. On the Flathead
Reservation, the tribal council refused to submit an official roll, considering the policy to be, in
the words of Walter McDonald, a violation of their “sacred rights.” Kootenai elder Jerome
Hewankorn echoed McDonald stating that God had “put the Indians here and gave us this land.
Then the white man came and kept pushing us back and back. Finally we had only this
reservation. Now they want to sell us out.” But the tribal council was not entirely in concert on
the matter. Councilman Morigeau insisted that he would prefer a cash payment to a broken
treaty, stating “a cash bond would protect us better. There is no protection in our treaty.” CSKT
members and founders of the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) Steve de Mers and

Bailey, 308-10; David G. Lewis, “John Collier and Indian Termination Policy” Quartux: Journal of Critical
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(1972), 257–70.
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D’arcy McNickle made a joint statement laying out conditions under which they would be
willing to comply with the termination policy. Their seven-part plan required among other
provisions, that the agreement be mutual, that the federal government repair all roads on the
reservation prior to termination, that they complete a comprehensive survey of timber and
mineral resources, that the tribal government be allowed to form a corporation and take control
of those resources, and that both parties be given the opportunity to review the policy in court at
a later date.29
While termination remained federal policy until 1975 Interior backed down slightly from
its aggressive pursuit of the policy when Fred Seaton replaced Douglas McKay in 1957. 30 At a
meeting of the NCAI in Missoula, September 1958, Assistant Secretary of the Interior Roger
Ernest claimed that termination would only be sought in necessary cases and with the informed
consent of all involved. Congressmen Lee Metcalf spoke at the meeting as well, where he
contested Ernest’s claim that Interior had the good of Native people in mind, pledging “war on
the Bureau of Indian Affairs on behalf of Indian rights.”31 Termination was generally unpopular
on the Flathead Reservation, with only twenty percent of respondents in one survey and thirty
percent in another expressing a desire to dissolve the reservation in return for a cash payment. 32
For pro-termination voices such as Lorena Burgess and those who at least briefly considered the
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policy such as E. W. Morigeau, what mattered most was that federal oversight had generally led
to the development of on reservation resources for no on reservation benefit.33 Evidence to
support that belief abounded, such as in Montana Power’s miserliness when it came to paying
rent on the Kerr Dam, the designation of Mission valley timber lands as roadless wilderness
without tribal consent, or the repeated efforts to flood the lower Flathead River under Paradise
Lake. However, looking at the example of the Klamath River tribes, it is clear that extracting
wealth from native lands was a feature not merely of federal trusteeship, but of American
capitalism.
Whereas Lorena Burgess was an outlier with regard to termination, she was in line with
much of the tribe regarding Paradise-Knowles. The Burgess family established their homestead
eight miles east of Paradise, just upstream from the Knowles site in 1911. Lorena and Harry
spent the early years of their marriage establishing an orchard out of the 800 acres they owned,
raising nine children, and in time renting another 9,000 acres as their farm and ranch expanded.
All of the life that they had built was set to be flooded if either Paradise or Knowles dam were
ever built.34 That possibility spurred Lorena Burgess towards a determined activism against
Paradise Dam and against federal power development writ large. Burgess was well known by
Montana’s elected officials for her constant correspondence on dam proposals. During the 1948–
49 Paradise Dam debate, Burgess gathered seven pages of signatures on a petition against the
dam, with names representing a significant portion of the populations of Plains and Paradise,
Montana. The cover letter to those petitions indicated that 96% of those Burgess approached
E. W. Morigeau’s position with regard to termination changed over time from the pro-termination opinion that he
(or possibly his cousin Walter Morigeau) expressed in 1953, to a firmly anti-termination position in a 1961 editorial,
and finally to a position of optional withdrawal which would give individual members the opportunity to take a
single payment and disenroll from the tribe, see “Morigeau Writes Views of Proposed Indian Charter” Char-Koosta
4, no. 7 (March, 1961); and Morigeau, Valley Creek, 81, 127–29.
34
Biographical details from “I am Lorena Burgess,” Lorena Burgess to Army Corps of Engineers Missoula,
Montana, October 21, 1957, Lorena Burges Papers (LBP) box 4, folder 8.
33

94

were eager to sign, and those who refused were all “tavern, beer parlor or gas station owners.” 35
In 1958, she penned a letter to the District Engineer of the Army Corps detailing her objections
to Knowles and endorsing the headwaters flood control plan of the UCDC. In that letter, she
praised both private enterprise power development and public power champion Julius Krug, who
had in 1949 condemned the flooding of Crow land for the Yellowtail Dam.36 In a 1960 issue of
tribal newsletter Char-Koosta, Burgess wrote an open letter to James Murray urging the senator
to consider all that would be destroyed by the dam, including wildlife, ranches, mills, and
highways, but putting extra emphasis on the violation of treaty rights. In addition to all that the
dam would destroy, Burgess questioned who would benefit from a federal dam, asking the
senator, “why should successful stable citizens give up their possessions to satisfy the unstable
elements of Western Montana?”37 Burgess’ argument was not purely about protecting the land,
she also seems to have embraced the reactionary individualism common among private
electricity promoters.
While Montana’s Congressional delegation continued their attempts to attach Knowles
appropriations to every version of the Rivers and Harbors Act, the Montana Power Company
formed their own plans for new Flathead dams. MPC drew up plans with the help of San
Francisco's Bechtel Corporation and began test drilling at the Buffalo Rapids sites to ensure their
viability. In 1961 they submitted an application to the FPC for two dams: a 788 ft long, 110 ft
high dam at Buffalo Rapids 2 with 1,360 ft earth fill abutments on either side which would hold
back a 3,350 acre reservoir reaching the foot of Kerr Dam when full, and a second 830 ft long,
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130 ft high dam at Buffalo Rapids 4 with a 1,120 ft earth fill abutment on the East side forming a
3,370 acre reservoir extending 24 miles back to the base of the Buffalo Rapids 2 Dam. The two
dams, according to Montana Power, had a theoretical capacity of 688 megawatts, a figure which
was likely exaggerated. When asked about their plan for the dams, MPC President John Corette
described the project as a partnership with CSKT, “because the Indians own the land and would
receive a rental for it, while the company would own the dams and facilities.” Despite the fact
that the MPC plan was not supported by the tribal council, Corrette went on to say that getting
the project approved and constructed would “undoubtedly require the combined efforts and cooperation of the tribal council, the company and other organizations in western Montana.” 38
Those sorts of statements boldly declaring a partnership where there was open competition
earned Corrette his nickname of “inCorrette” from Lee Metcalf.39
Relations between the Montana Power Company and the tribes had been strained since
the construction of Kerr Dam and had only gotten worse once the company installed a third
turbine at the Kerr in 1954. The additional turbine added fifty-six megawatts to the dam’s
capacity, increasing the revenue that MPC made off of the power. CSKT leaders believed that
additional revenue should be reflected in the rent paid to the tribes, as the ability to add
additional turbines was implied in the dam's original design and explicitly stated in the FPC
license. The license agreement stated that increased revenue from the dam would “result in a
corresponding increase of Indian rental based upon the increased earning.”40 Not wanting to cut
into their profits, Montana Power under John Corrette applied for an early renewal of their FPC
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license which would not expire until 1980, hoping to readjust their rents to the tribes according
to their own calculations, rather than those imposed by the Power Commission. The early
relicense was denied. In 1961, the FPC decided that the third turbine would merit an increase of
$50,000/year, before Interior Secretary Stewart Udall increased that amount to $63,375/year.
MPC refused to pay until forced to do so by a court order later that year. The conflict over
payments for Kerr Dam led the tribes to pursue their own dams without the government or the
Montana Power Company.41
With the termination policy threatening to open what remained of the tribal trust lands to
extraction by outside corporations, Walter McDonald, and Walter Morigeau after him, led the
CSKT council to seek economic sustainability from within the tribe. At a public hearing on the
Paradise-Knowles proposal held in Missoula on March 9, 1959, Walter McDonald claimed that
the tribes had no official position on the public-private power debate. From the position of the
tribal council, what mattered was that the tribes be fairly compensated no matter what dams were
built. But compensation was not merely a single payment, or even a fixed recurring payment.
Fearing that what had happened to the Crow Tribe with the Yellowtail Dam authorization may
happen to the CSKT, he called for recurring payments and guaranteed power with frequent
adjustments to keep those payments at a market rate. According to the consulting engineer that
had assessed the Buffalo Rapids sites on behalf of the tribe, that amount would need to start at
$355,000 per year for power revenue in addition to compensation for flooded land.42 In
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November of that same year, the council moved beyond the ambivalent position expressed by
McDonald at the hearing and resolved officially against Knowles or any other downstream dam
by a unanimous vote. In their resolution, CSKT leaders cited the loss of the Buffalo Rapids sites,
insisting that the tribe be allowed to “develop these sites for the best long-range advantage of the
Flathead Indians.”43 McDonald’s vision for Buffalo Rapids was a reflection of what Mansfield
had done with the Hungry Horse Dam years earlier. At a 1962 Congressional hearing on the
Rivers and Harbors Act, CSKT leaders made it clear that their plan for the Buffalo Rapids Dams
aligned with the public power vision of Metcalf and Mansfield. The CSKT stated that the tribes’
opposition to Knowles should not imply support for the Montana Power Company or the private
enterprise doctrine of the private electricity industry: “Our proposal is for public power
development by the tribes as a government… as opposed to the private development by Montana
Power Co.” For McDonald, the Buffalo Rapids Dams did not represent underdevelopment of
water power, but rather the development of water power by and for the people who possessed a
rightful claim to the resource. The public power visionaries had constructed their imagined
public too broadly, sacrificing the people living in the Flathead Valley for the economic
advancement of Montana and the West. The tribes adopted the social vision of power production
in the public interest, however the public which they represented was composed only of those
living within their sovereign territory, not ratepayers in Missoula or Portland.44
At that same 1962 Hearing on the Rivers and Harbors Act, the CSKT statement against
Knowles objected primarily to the Army Corps’ assessment of the value of tribal resources that
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Knowles Dam would destroy. In their reports, the Corps had emphasized the recreational value
of a potential reservoir, which the CSKT representatives claimed was tantamount to replacing
“subsistence fishing by tribal members” with “mere sport for the white man.” The disregard for
tribal sovereignty continued in the text of the bill itself, which Walter Morigeau pointed out
framed the preservation of treaty rights as merely an act of “congressional generosity” rather
than the supreme law of the land. Their concerns about Knowles encompassed also the
ecological impact of the project, as they defended the riparian area, claiming that, “the lowlands
where are bred Canadian geese, pheasants, and winter forage for deer which would be preserved
by the low head dams proposed for building by the tribes as compared the the high dam at
Knowles.” However, the greatest concern that CSKT leaders had with the Knowles Dam was the
loss of the Buffalo Rapids sites. According to Morigeau, these sites were among the most
valuable hydropower sites in the country and had not been accurately appraised by the Corps of
Engineers who had not included compensation for lost power revenue in their budget for the
Knowles project. If the true value of the damsites were to be assessed and paid to the tribes in
annual payments of firm power from Knowles or cash equivalent, the CSKT expressed a
willingness to negotiate. If however, the lost power revenue were not considered or it were to be
paid in a single lump sum, the tribes were unequivocally opposed to Knowles. The final bill
passed with the Knowles appropriation removed.45
The tribes’ appeal to public power ideology failed to sway Lee Metcalf, who in a
Summer 1963 public communication from his office stated that he “differed with some of his
friends of the Flathead Tribe” on what dams ought to be built. Mansfield, however, was less
clear in his position. While avoiding any overt conflict between the two Democratic senators,
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Mansfield’s office consistently reported that his support for Knowles was contingent on local
support from a majority of the people affected. The UCDC took this cautious statement and the
senator’s past statements in support of the rights of the Confederated Tribes as evidence of a split
between the two senators.46
As private and tribal dam advocates struggled to secure permits, Knowles Dam
supporters also found little success. Democratic National Committeewoman for Montana and
Executive Secretary of the Committee for Paradise Dam Francis Logan Merriam complained
throughout 1962 of a media and letter writing blitz carried out by the Montana Power Company
against public power plans. The retired teacher who owned a ranch near Charlo, Montana, noted
in her letters to Senator Metcalf that the destructive power of a Knowles Reservoir grew every
time John Corrette spoke.47 When the American Crystal Sugar Company came out against
Knowles, Merriam conducted an independent investigation, interviewing sugar beet growers
throughout the valley and reporting her findings to Metcalf.48 Merriam’s letters often referred to
the Knowles debate as if it were a military campaign, an apt metaphor considering the sheer
volume of words being lobbed against the federal hydropower proposal by allies of Montana
Power.49 The Sanders County Ledger ran two full pages with graphs, images, and quotes
insisting on the superiority of the Buffalo Rapids Plan over Knowles.50 The Flathead Courier of
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Polson, a reliable ally of the Montana Power Company since its founding, churned out a steady
stream of editorials against Knowles and in favor of Buffalo Rapids.51 The Ronan Pioneer
insisted based on anecdotal evidence that the majority of western Montanans favored Buffalo
Rapids and were disappointed with their Senators’ support of Knowles. 52 The Daily Missoulian
highlighted the fact that federal dams paid no local tax in their editorials supporting Montana
Power’s designs.53 Even Mel Rudder’s Hungry Horse News, which had generally favored public
over private development, was ambivalent toward the whole affair, wishing instead that Montana
Democrats would work toward quicker completion of the Libby and Yellowtail projects rather
than wrangling over the Flathead.54 Lee Metcalf described the media blitz as an “oratorical flood
submerging facts” under which public power Democrats struggled to catch their breath.55
While president Kennedy had promised at a campaign rally in Billings that he would “not
stand by and permit another Hells Canyon blunder in the Clark Fork basin,” when pressured by
John Corrette three years later, the President was less than committed.56 Corrette, attending a
meeting of the Committee for Economic Development in Washington D.C. asked the President
why the government insisted on holding up private development in areas such as High Mountain
Sheep on the Snake River and Buffalo Rapids on the Flathead. His line of questioning, intended
to put Kennedy on his back foot, succeeded as the president replied that, “if a private company
can develop a site and provide a service more satisfactorily than the federal government, then the
private company should go ahead. Indeed as I said, I would put the burden of proof on the
federal government” to demonstrate that private interests were not capable of developing a
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resource.57 That statement in itself did not rule out the administration’s support for Knowles over
Buffalo Rapids, but it was not the ringing endorsement of the public power scheme that
Montana’s senators wanted to hear from the president
At the height of debate over damming the Flathead, disparate groups began to find
common cause. In 1963, Winton Weydemeyer encouraged UCDC leader Clyde Fickes to
leverage the interests of the Confederated Tribes of the Flathead Reservation in their campaign
against Knowles, writing “I think the truthful but politically naive excuse for Knowles offered by
our Congressmen is going to backfire. Perhaps our best chance for blocking the project is the
tribal rights and treaty angle.”58 In June of 1963, 25 representatives from conservation,
agriculture, business, and tribal groups opposing Knowles traveled to Washington to plead their
case. The appeal had little effect on Secretary Udall, who saw the fact that the tribes were not
opposed to river development as tacit approval for Interior to build the best dam possible. Were
the tribes to oppose dams outright, Udall argued, he might be sympathetic to their claims, but if
development was to happen at all, it would happen on his terms. 59 In the years previous the
UCDC had insisted repeatedly that Montanans completely reject Paradise Dam and all of the
alternative projects, including Buffalo Rapids 2 & 4. Preferring their headwaters flood control
plan to any development on the mainstem of the Flathead River, they called for “complete
rejection of these proposals.” However, in 1963, they reversed course, with a 1963 UCDC
Newsletter containing maps extolling the benefits of Buffalo Rapids 2 & 4.60
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After years of conflict between the two entities, the Montana Power Company and the
CSKT filed a joint application to build the Buffalo Rapids Dams in 1964. The joint application
included both Buffalo Rapids dams and an early relicense for the Kerr Dam. Not all members of
the Confederated Tribes were in favor of this new partnership. Jerome Hewankorn, a former
council member of the Confederated Tribes of the Flathead Reservation collected donations from
friends and family for a petition drive in which he traveled around the reservation collecting
signatures on a petition to Secretary Udall and FPC Commissioner Swidler. At least thirty-nine
tribal members signed a letter insisting that the Buffalo Rapids dams and early licensing of the
Kerr Dam would not be in the tribe’s best interest and calling for a full vote of CSKT
membership on the matter. They feared that by funding dam construction and providing
securities for loans, the tribe would not have enough money to cover per capita payments to
members. They also doubted that the jobs dam construction would provide would be Native jobs,
although Salish and Kootenai people had worked on the Kerr Dam in the 1930s and some had
also worked on Hungry Horse Dam.61 Most of all, they were skeptical of the Montana Power
Company’s intentions in renewing its license for Kerr Dam. Tribal ownership of Kerr had long
been a priority, but if the Buffalo Rapids application were granted, the opportunity for the tribe
to take control of Kerr would be postponed an extra thirty years.62
When Jerome Hewankorn served on the CSKT Council, he had fought the ParadiseKnowles dams, but in his cover letter to Secretary Udall and Commissioner Swidler, he reversed
course and recommended that Knowles Dam be built as soon as possible. Hewankorn’s reversal
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on Knowles is perplexing, but there are a few possibilities for his change of heart. Jerome did not
own a typewriter, and he did not mail the petitions himself. The logistics of typing and mailing
the petitions was handled by Francis Logan Merriam of the Committee for Paradise Dam. It is
possible that she swayed Hewankorn’s opinion or that she typed the cover letter herself. Merriam
denied any involvement, writing in a letter to Lee Metcalf that the line about Knowles was
“absolutely spontaneous” and that she had “made no effort to get him to commit himself on the
controversy, pro or con.”63 Another possibility is that Hewankorn, knowing the Interior
Secretary’s preference for the Knowles project, was attempting to win Udall over with his plea.
A third explanation arises from the accusations of corruption among Morigeau and McDonald
that Hewankorn made in later appeals to Udall. The McDonald and Morigeau families had been
accused throughout their time in tribal leadership of self-dealing and nepotism. Henry Lozeau of
the Flathead-Kootenai Organization had called for a “full-scale and immediate investigation” of
the Morigeau led council in 1962 and former tribal treasurer Robert McCrea had complained of
financial misconduct in a letter to Mike Mansfield that same year.64 Jerome Hewankorn, as a
fellow council member and a longtime acquaintance of Morigeau, was familiar with these
accusations and expressed his suspicion of the council’s trustworthiness in letter to Udall.
Accepting that one dam or another was going to be built—as was the assumption in the past—
Hewankorn may have seen the Knowles Dam and the compensation that would come with it as
the only chance for tribal members on the whole to reap any benefit. Of course, there is a fourth
possibility, which should not go unmentioned and that is that Jerome Hewankorn sincerely
believed in the public power vision of the Knowles Dam promoters. Whether Mrs. Logan had
convinced him to support Knowles or if Hewankorn’s dogged opposition to the tribe’s joint
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venture stemmed from his lack of faith in the council is impossible to know. Regardless of his
motivation, Hewankorn went to great lengths to gather signatures on his petitions, showing that
Native American opposition to Knowles and support of Buffalo Rapids was not universal.
In addition to Jerome Hewankorn’s petition, several other organizations submitted formal
complaints against the Buffalo Rapids application. The Committee for Paradise Dam passed a
resolution condemning the project and calling on the FPC to prevent “incomplete and wasteful
development” of water power.65 Labor representatives from the Montana Carpenters District
Council to the national legislative secretary of the AFL-CIO wrote to the FPC to express their
misgivings with Montana Power and the Buffalo Rapids plan.66 The Swan Valley Farmers
Union, invoking a catastrophic 1964 flood as justification, used the Buffalo Rapids licensing
fight as an opportunity not merely to call for the Knowles Dam, but to revive calls for the Glacier
View and Spruce Park Dams on the upper forks of the Flathead.67
Perhaps the most surprising name among the collection of letters condemning the Buffalo
Rapids application and calling for the construction of the larger Paradise-Knowles Dam instead
was Sierra Club president David Brower.68 Like previous club president Lewis F. Clark, Brower
was motivated by his fear that if the public power lobby lost their project on the Lower Flathead,
they would turn to the North Fork and the Glacier View Dam to meet power demand. Brower
had faced a similar situation a decade previous when he stood down on the Glen Canyon Dam
bill as a trade off for preserving Dinosaur National Monument from the proposed Echo Park
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Dam. The diehard preservationist later expressed his deep regret for having been “a wimp” in
1957, reckoning that he could have stopped the Glen Canyon Dam if he had tried, but he did not
feel the same way about his stance on Paradise-Knowles in 1965.69 In his autobiography For
Earth’s Sake, Brower chalked his support for Paradise up to the charisma of Lee Metcalf who he
had considered a valuable ally on wilderness legislation, writing passively “I found myself
writing an article in favor of a dam—the proposed Paradise Dam on the Clark Fork, to save it
from underdevelopment at the hands of the Montana Power Company.”70 Perhaps if ParadiseKnowles had been built the “archdruid” would have had more to say or written an impassioned
call for it to be torn down.71
The various resolutions and petitions against the Buffalo Rapids application aligned with
Swidler and Udall’s understanding of the public interest in the Flathead River, as they denied the
Buffalo Rapids permit on the grounds that it did not represent a “comprehensive plan for
improving or developing a waterway.”72 Reporting on the FPC decision, an editorial in the Wall
Street Journal ran under the headline “Two Hats and a Mass Scalping” which was reprinted in
the Daily Missoulian with the headline “Scalping Indians Pays and Pays and Pays.” The editorial
ridiculed Udall for confusing his role as head of Reclamation with his role as head of Indian
Affairs by cheating the tribe out of revenue in order to preserve dam sites for the federal
government.73 Hewankorn responded to that article in another letter to Udall in which he detailed
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numerous failed business ventures of the Confederated Tribes, writing that he was doubtful of
their ability not to get cheated by Montana Power.74
Stewart Udall’s decision to intervene against the Buffalo Rapids dams may have been for
the sake of seeing the river fully developed, but unbeknownst to the Interior Secretary, his
actions were part of a chain of events which would ensure that the Flathead River flowed freely
for generations to come. Paradise-Knowles was one of the last gasps of the public power
movement that had started during the New Deal. In the 1950s, that movement had faced setbacks
from private electricity developers and their allies in the Republican Party—especially at Hells
Canyon, but in the 1960s public power Democrats also started to lose the support of their most
committed partners in Congress as they began to reckon with the environmental impact of dams.
Senator Frank Church of Idaho, whose first speech on the Senate floor was an impassioned call
for the Hells Canyon High Dam, became one of the leading voices for river protection after the
fish ladder at Idaho Power’s Brownlee Dam failed in 1958, ensuring the extinction of salmon
runs above the dam and shaking Church’s confidence in engineers.75 Stewart Udall, who had
himself written the legislation that created the Glen Canyon Dam in Arizona, became a wild
rivers crusader after a family trip down the Colorado River where he saw firsthand what would
soon be buried beneath Lake Powell.76
The environmental evolution of national Democrats in the 1960s was preceded by a
similar development among Republicans in the previous decade. Many Republicans had a longer
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history of preservationist sympathies than their Democratic colleagues, but even some who had
previously supported private hydropower projects were converted to the wilderness ethic in the
mid-twentieth century. Winton Weydemeyer was an archetypical Republican conservationist,
although his endorsement of small dams set him apart from others. John P. Saylor of
Pennsylvania, who had initially supported Idaho Power’s dams in Hells Canyon, was converted
to preservation by a river trip. The Republican Congressman and his family were taken on a float
trip down the Yampa River in northwest Colorado in 1952 by veteran river guide and Sierra Club
member Bus Hatch. Hatch later said that it was when Saylor saw how his children embraced the
thrill of a wild river that he joined the fight against dams. David Brower later attributed the
preservation of Dinosaur National Monument and the creation of the National Wilderness
Preservation System to Saylor above anyone else except perhaps Wilderness Society President
Howard Zahniser.77 Walter Hickel, Interior Secretary during the Nixon Administration also had a
whitewater epiphany, as a rafting trip through Hells Canyon informed his decision to deny
permits for the High Mountain Sheep Dam in Idaho.78
By the 1970s, the political calculus of dam building had changed entirely. Whereas in the
Eisenhower Years, private electricity companies defeated the grand visions of the public power
Democrats and won authorization for smaller dams, in the 1960s even comparatively small
private dams faced intense scrutiny. In 1966, Udall appealed an FPC decision which had
authorized the Pacific Northwest Power Company to build the High Mountain Sheep Dam on the
Snake River on the grounds that such a dam would be contrary to the public interest and thus a
violation of the Federal Power Act.79 Writing for the majority, Supreme Court Justice William O.
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Douglas wrote an opinion that redefined the public interest with regard to hydropower writing
that the FPC in granting a license must explore, “all issues relevant to the ‘public interest,’
including future power demand and supply, alternate sources of power, the public interest in
preserving reaches of wild rivers and wilderness areas… and the protection of wildlife.” 80 In that
decision Douglas had given legal weight to the preservation of wild rivers. The following year,
the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act passed by a near unanimous vote. That law, which had been
drafted by Montana wildlife biologist Frank Craighead based on data gathered from river runners
including Clifton Merritt of Kalispell, created a system for assessing the wild, scenic, and
recreational value of a river and preserving it from future development. While he supported the
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Lee Metcalf still clung to the dream of damming the Flathead and
lobbied to keep the Forks of the Flathead off of the initial list of protected streams. 81
The energy crisis of the 1970s brought renewed calls for dams in western Montana, but
they were met with lackluster support.82 Army Engineers studied the feasibility of the Lower
Flathead dams in 1976 and a deeper study of the Clark Fork Basin in 1977 which included plans
for a dam at Quartz Creek on the Clark Fork, a site which would drown the popular whitewater
rafting destination known as the Alberton Gorge.83 The initial report found that while the Buffalo
Rapids 2 and 4 had the potential to secure congressional approval, Knowles was far too
80
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controversial.84 At public hearings required by the 1970 National Environmental Policy Act,
local people objected to each of the dams due to their potential to harm native trout, concerns
that the tribes would not be properly compensated, and the possibility of a catastrophic failure,
with one Paradise resident invoking the example of the 1972 Teton Dam disaster in Idaho.85 In
their final report in 1978, the Army Corps estimated that the Buffalo Rapids dams would only
produce a maximum of ninety-four megawatts, a 60% reduction from the overconfident figures
advertised by Montana Power in the previous decade.86 The report concluded by considering
conservation as a means of meeting power demand, although they did not believe that it could
“eliminate the ultimate need for alternative sources of power” including coal, nuclear, and
hydropower.87
As the 1980 license renewal date for Kerr Dam approached, the Montana Power
Company emphasized the need for more power. MPC president Joseph A. McElwain took aim at
the Carter Administration’s energy conservation policy in an address to the Polson Rotary Club
in July 1979, arguing that “we need to promote energy production in this country as well as to
conserve.” The power company president set his sights on the environmental regulatory regime
bemoaning the “Ninety-one permits from forty-three agencies” required to open a nuclear plant
in California. After arguing for more nuclear power, the construction of an Alaska oil pipeline,
and expanding coal mining in Colstrip, MT, McElwain waded into the controversial subject of
hydropower. While he acknowledged that new dams were controversial and his opinions would
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be unpopular, he endorsed every private and federal dam from Libby to Buffalo Rapids and even
Glacier View and Spruce Park. Every dam that is, except Paradise-Knowles.88
Tribal leaders, however, were once again out of step with the power company. In 1972,
Montana Power once again held closed door meetings with tribal leadership about building the
Buffalo Rapids dams in conjunction with their application to relicense Kerr Dam in 1980. 89 In
1977, CSKT members voted to reject offers from Montana Power to buy the dam sites and
questioned whether the claims of power shortage were to be trusted. Councilman Joe McDonald
insisted that the tribe ought to consider the value they had not just in reserved dam sites, but in a
free flowing river.90 Interest in the river as it was had grown throughout the decade, with guided
canoe trips on the calmer sections of the river and more daring rafting missions through the
Buffalo Rapids themselves.91 Writing about the wild character of the river in 1972, a CharKoosta reporter noted that “there are few untouched rivers left in this country” and that while
“the river below Flathead lake is not as highly regarded as the upstream portion, there are
abundant rainbow and Cutthroat trout ranging from pan to trophy size.”92
Tribal pursuits of hydropower projects played a role in the decline of dam building in
America. Since intellectual historian and Sierra Club member Roderick Nash wrote the first
scholarly account of the Grand Canyon Dams fight, historians have tended to give the Sierra
Club and their charismatic leader Brower all of the credit for saving the Grand Canyon, but lost
in the David vs. Goliath narrative is the role that the Hualapai played.93 Historian Byron Pearson
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points out that the Hualapai Tribe submitted their own application to dam the Colorado River on
their own reservation and were roundly denied the right to do so, while the Interior Department
maintained their designs within the National Park.94 The narrative parallels that of the Salish and
Kootenai, whose attempt to work around both the private schemes of the Montana Power
Company and the public power schemes of Interior was met with delay and denial. While it
would be too much to say that the threat of Native people seizing their own means of electricity
production brought about the end of federal hydropower on its own, those attempts certainly
heightened the tension both inside and outside of the tribes.
Within the CSKT, those who had opposed both the Paradise Dam and the Buffalo Rapids
Dams gained political traction by the 1980s. In 1982, Salish elder and Wilderness Society
president Thurman Trosper succeeded in his lifelong effort to protect the Mission Mountains
where he had spent his youth. Having served his country in the Marine Corps at Guadalcanal,
Trosper returned home to serve as a civilian in the Forest Service and later the National Park
Service. Upon his retirement in 1973, he devoted his time to working with the Wilderness
Society, presenting plans for a tribal wilderness in the Mission Mountains to the CSKT council
in 1974 when a logging plan was being considered. He defeated the logging proposal with the
help of three yayas—respected elders or grandmothers in the Salish Tribe—and eight years later
ushered in the nation’s first Tribal Wilderness.95 Preserving the Missions, while a rebuke of the
vision for tribal economic development advanced by Walter McDonald in the 1950s, was a
significant development in the enactment of tribal sovereignty on the Flathead Reservation. Four
years later, the tribal council under the leadership of Ron Thirriault, voted to preserve the Lower
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Flathead River from all future dam development.96 These developments should not be
understood as the preservationist logic of non-Indians coming belatedly to the tribes, but rather
that the tribes had gained enough security in their control of their resources and built the tools of
governance necessary to enact preservation.97 Amidst the threat of termination, industrial
development seemed the surest route to sovereignty. Once that threat had subsided,
preservationist interests could assert themselves and gain favor in tribal governance. Some
members of the tribe have insisted that preservation was always the goal, even if it was not
always feasible. In an interview with historian Jaakko Puisto, CSKT member Noel Pichette
remarked that if they had better lawyers, the tribes could have avoided allotment and the
authorization of Kerr Dam.98 Perhaps if the tribes possessed the tools to do so in 1882, Chief
Eneas would have been able to keep the railroads out of the Flathead Lake country. 99 While the
tribes were not able to avoid those decisions in the late 19th and early 20th centuries—and were
likewise unable to secure permits for the Buffalo Rapids Dams in the 1960s—the struggle
against termination and for resource development laid the groundwork for the tribe to assume
greater control of their own resources in the 1970s and 80s.

Puisto, 14; “Tribes Say No to Dams,” Missoulian 1986.
For one example see CSKT members opposed to E. W. Morigeau’s 1959 proposal for open pit mining on
reservation land, Morigeau, Valley Creek, 86.
98
Ibid., 14, 22 n52.
99
Kootenai Chief Eneas stated in 1882 during discussion of the Flathead Railroad treaty: “I don’t wish the road to
pass through this reservation… This reservation is a small country, and yet you want five depots upon it. These are
the best spots on the reservation. What is the reason I should be encouraged when you take the best part of my
country?” transcript of the treaty negotiation can be found in William Kittredge and Annick Smith eds., The Last
Best Place: A Montana Anthology, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988), 354–364, Eneas quote on 357.
96
97

113

Conclusion

The political and economic dynamics of damming the Flathead and Clark Fork Rivers in
the twentieth century and of economic development in the western United States broadly can be
understood as the clash of at least three competing expressions of capitalism, identified by the
geographer Peter Walker in 2003. Walker concluded from his study of California exurbs in the
1990s that resource conflicts in the American West result from the clash of “the older resourcebased economy (ranching, timber); a development industry; and the newer rural-residential,
amenity-based economy.”100 Despite the differences between California exurbs and the river
valleys of the Northern Rockies, his model holds considerable explanatory power in this case.
The older extractive or resource-based economy is that which is embodied by ranching, timber,
and mining, as well as private electricity development. That extractive mode of capitalism,
sometimes described in colonial terms, was the baseline across the West in the early twentieth
century. The second expression in Walker’s study—which he terms the “development
industry”—is that of suburban property developers, but when looking at water power
development, that role is better understood as that of the public power lobby. This group staked
the economic future of the region on replacing temporary labor and unsustainable extraction with
a permanent and stable residential workforce. Mike Mansfield, James Murray, and Lee Metcalf
all sought to liberate their constituents from the timber and mining industry by harnessing the
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water power resources of the region to create a new industrial-residential landscape. By
competing for control of dam sites, regulation of power marketing, and the livelihoods of
workers who would otherwise be forced to take low paying seasonal jobs, the capitalism
championed by the public power Democrats was a threat to the existing extractive industries, and
thus maligned as totalitarian socialism. The final expression of capitalism competing for primacy
in the West was that of the preservationists who opposed both of the earlier models in order to
protect what they saw—whether for their spiritual, ecological, scenic, or recreational value—as
irreplaceable amenities. This third expression is less obviously capitalist but considering the
growth of tourism and real estate as major industries in the mountain states, it becomes clear that
wilderness preservation also lends to the commodification of nature and (perhaps inadvertently)
supports profit-driven industry. To these three, it is perhaps necessary to add a fourth competing
interest—that of tribal self-determination. The methods employed by members of the Salish and
Kootenai Tribes at various times resembled each of the three capitalisms described above, but
almost always with the goal of employing those methods for their own sake and on their own
terms.
The conflicts around private and public power and between preservation and
development were deeply ideological and cultural, but also, as Walker points out, “reflect
underlying tensions between competing capitalisms that commodify nature in incompatible
ways.”101 Ideological and cultural differences between supporters of public power, private
enterprise, various expressions of tribal sovereignty, and wilderness preservation are clearly
evident in the newspaper editorials, the committee pamphlets and mailers, and the speeches
given by those representing one camp or another. The American system, socialism,
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underdevelopment, dispossession, totalitarianism, progress, sacred rights, self-determination, all
of these phrases were cast about with true conviction by people intent on securing support for
their own version of the West. That conviction flowed from the fundamental incompatibility of
their plans for water power development. Both Walter McDonald and John Corrette’s plans to
build run of river dams at Buffalo Rapids were incompatible with Lee Metcalf’s vision for a
large federal dam at Paradise. Paradise Dam, Knowles Dam, and the Buffalo Rapids Dams were
all incompatible with the desires of Salish and Kootenai preservationists like Thurman Trosper
and Ron Therriault to see the river left unspoiled.
In the first half of the twentieth century, western progressives attempted to overcome
extractive capitalism through coordinated river development. Extractive industry had generated
tremendous wealth for the executives of Anaconda, Northern Pacific, and Montana Power, while
working class people faced seasonal unemployment or worked on substandard farms without
electric equipment. In order to bring the benefits of electricity to everyone, to stem the tide of
migration out of rural towns and into industrial cities, and to maximize the public benefit and
long term yield of natural resources, progressive reformers instituted conservation measures and
attempted to regulate the power industry. Progress proved slow and regulation ineffective,
leading the next generation of progressives to pursue the funding and construction of massive
power projects by the federal government and direct financing of rural electrification. In some
isolated cases, they managed to displace extractive capital and create suburban manufacturing
communities, such as in the town of Columbia Falls, Montana, where the construction of Hungry
Horse Dam and the power it supplied to the Anaconda Aluminum Company created stable union
jobs for over 600 families. The New Deal model of public power production was successful in
creating Bonneville Power and bringing the aluminum industry to the Columbia Basin states, but
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attempts to expand the purview of federal dam builders and coordinate each of the nation’s major
river valleys ultimately failed.
While many factors contributed to the failure of public power to expand after the New
Deal, the single greatest factor was the coordinated efforts of private electricity companies.
Trade associations and business leaders both directly and through their allies in the press and
civic organizations throughout the country painted the public power project as misguided and
malicious, a step on the road to socialism, if not an outright sprint down the path to
totalitarianism. During the presidency of Dwight Eisenhower, and especially Douglas McKay’s
tenure as Interior Secretary from 1953–56, private interests won control of Idaho’s Snake River
at Hells Canyon, one of the public power movement’s most sought after dam sites. Democratic
politicians tried to revive some long defeated federal hydropower projects during the Kennedy
and Johnson administrations but were unable to secure their authorization in the changing
political landscape.102
From the stalemate between public and private power models in the early 1960s, the
preservationist movement began to win fights over individual dams and secure legal protections
for wild rivers. Those interests had gained recognition in part through private power publications
which broadcast the views of anyone critical of the federal dam building agencies. By
encouraging citizens to question the costs associated with New Deal style public works, the
private utilities inadvertently opened the door to a new preservationist paradigm that was both
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critical of government and reliant upon it to enforce protections for scenic rivers, wilderness
areas, and endangered species.
The sustainable economic future sought by public power Democrats proved elusive. Even
in Columbia Falls, the greatest example of Mike Mansfield’s policy in action, low-cost
hydropower could not protect the town from deindustrialization. Changes in the global metals
market sparked first by the nationalization of copper mines in Chile in 1970 eventually lead to
the downfall of the Anaconda Mining Company in 1977.103 After Anaconda ceased to be, the
Columbia Falls smelter changed hands multiple times with each new owner questioning whether
or not the plant was worth keeping online considering the costs associated with meeting new
state and federal environmental quality standards. Clean Air Act litigation against the plant,
spearheaded by local environmental activists, drove up the cost of production at the same time
that smelting operations in countries that did not have clean air regulations were driving down
the price of finished aluminum.104 From 1985 until at least 1992, the investment company which
owned the smelter defrauded workers out of millions of dollars in what were meant to be shared
profits.105 By 2009, the plant was being periodically shut down leaving many residents out of
work, and in 2016 Columbia Falls Aluminum closed its doors for good.106 The downfall of the
smelter paralleled the growth of the tourism economy and skyrocketing real estate values.
Columbia Falls has become a place far more associated with nearby Glacier National Park than
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with metals manufacturing.107 The scenic beauty and recreation opportunities of the region have
attracted newcomers to the area. Without the smoke stacks billowing toxic fumes into the air and
the plant leaching poisons into the river, Bad Rock Canyon has certainly become a more pleasant
place to live, but tourism jobs pay far less than manufacturing and housing costs continue to
rise.108 As Peter Walker noted, “The irony of the New West is that newcomers attracted by
diverse imaginaries of rural lifestyles often make real rural livelihoods unviable.” 109
Whereas the public power vision was never realized, the vision of tribal sovereignty over
water power on the Flathead Reservation has had greater success. The Confederated Tribes
began the process of obtaining the Kerr Dam in the 1980s when Montana Power’s initial FPC
license expired, finally succeeding in 2015.110 The tribes have since renamed the dam Seli’š
Ksanka Qlispe’ Dam, posthumously invalidating Cornelius Kelley’s claim that the dam would
stand as a testament to the memory of Frank Kerr for “an immeasurable time.”111 Lake County
officials have made the same complaints about tax exemption that were made sixty years prior
by Mel Ruder regarding Hungry Horse Dam. Tribal councilman Rob McDonald responded to the
accusation by stating, “We paid our taxes by ceding millions of acres of land in signing the
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treaty.”112 In 2021, the Confederated Tribes agreed to a historic compact with the state of
Montana and the United States government settling thousands of water rights claims and
transferring control of the National Bison Range over to the Tribes.113 The balance of
development-for-use and preservation long sought by self described conservationists is being
achieved by the CSKT, the first tribe in the nation to own and operate a major hydroelectric dam
and the first tribe to create and manage a tribal wilderness area. Thanks to the efforts of tribal
preservationists and the complex interrelation of political and economic forces over the course of
the first half of the twentieth century, the Lower Flathead River still runs free, crashing through
the ten foot waves of Buffalo Rapids, drifting calmly between the striated cliffs at Knowles,
merging with the equally powerful force of the Clark Fork at Paradise, and onward to join the
Columbia and eventually the Pacific Ocean.
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Appendix: Images

Figure 1.
Clark Fork Watershed. Original Image from The University of Montana Clark Fork Symposium,
2015. Edited by the Author.
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Figure 2.
Major Watersheds of North America. Created by the Author with imagery from United States
Geological Survey.
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Figure 3.
Columbia River Basin, produced by Wikimedia Commons user Kmusser, April 7, 2008.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Columbiarivermap.png
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Figure 4.
Missouri River Basin, produced by Wikimedia Commons user Shannon1, March 21, 2018.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Missouri_River_basin_map.png
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Figure 5.
Montana River Basin Subdivisions, produced by Bonneville Power Administration, 1991.
Accessed through Montana State Library.
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Figure 6.
The proposed Paradise Dam and Reservoir, as depicted by the UCDC. 1957. Winton
Weydemeyer Papers, box 3, folder 3.
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Figure 7.
The proposed Knowles Reservoir, 1958. Montana Fisheries Division Records. Box 2, Folder 36,
Montana Historical Society Archives, Helena, MT.
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Figure 8.
Sectionized map of the Flathead Indian Reservation, divided into individual allotments, 1917.
Mapping Montana and the West Collection, Montana Memory Project.
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Figure 9. UCDC Common Sense Flood Control Plan, map of the Clark Fork Basin. Each orange
triangle represents a proposed small dam. 1957. Winton Weydemeyer Papers, box 3, folder 3.
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Figure 10. UCDC Common Sense Flood Control Plan map of the Blackfoot River Drainage with
proposed small dams. 1957. Winton Weydemeyer Papers, box 3, folder 3.

130

Figure 11. Map of proposed and existing CVA Dams from Magnificent Columbia. 1949. Mike
Mansfield Papers, series 14, box 12, folder 10.
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Figure 12. Footprint of proposed Glacier
View Reservoir, 1948. Mike Mansfield
Papers, series 17, box 223, folder 2.
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Figure 13.
Spruce Park Dam Proposal, 1958. Mike Mansfield Papers, series 17, box 223, folder 5.
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Figure 14. Chief Koostahtah standing at the Place of Falling Water, future site of Kerr Dam.
1922. Paul Fugelberg Photograph Collection, Montana Memory Project.
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Figure 15.
Kerr Dam Groundbreaking, 1932. Morton J. Elrod Photograph Collection,
Mansfield Library Archives, University of Montana.
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Figure 16.
Aerial photograph of Kerr Dam, Flathead River, Montana, looking upriver. 1947. University of
Montana Mansfield Library.
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Figure 17.
Mike Mansfield speaking at Hungry Horse Dam dedication. 1952. Mike Mansfield Papers, series
37, 98-809.
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Figure 18.
Hungry Horse Dam Dedication, 1952. L to R: H. Truman, C. H. Spencer, M. Mansfield. Mike
Mansfield Papers, University of Montana, series 37.
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Figure 19.
Loggers eating lunch in the Flathead National Forest, 1943. Low pay and inconsistent hours for
men like these was what Mansfield hoped to solve with the Columbia Falls Aluminum plant,
image from Anaconda Forest Products Company Records, University of Montana.
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Figure 20.
Bureau of Reclamation Photo showing Hungry Horse Damsite, 1945; image from George
Sundborg, Economic Basis For Power Markets in Flathead County, Montana, 4.

140

Figure 21.
Westbound locomotives of the Northern Pacific Railroad at Paradise, Montana. May, 1949. The
canyon in which Paradise Dam would have been built can be seen in the center right of the
photo. A.E. Bennett photo. Used with permission from american-rails.com
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Figure 22.
Anti-CVA pamphlet, 1950. Mike Mansfield Papers, series 14, box 12, folder 10.
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Figure 23.
Magnificent Columbia pamphlet, 1949. Mike Mansfield Papers, series 14, box 12, folder 10.
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Figure 24.
Montana Congressmen chat ahead of a hearing, March 31, 1960.
Winton Weydemeyer Papers, box 1, folder 1.
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Figure 25.
Artist’s depiction of the potential water column above Paradise, UCDC. 1957. Winton
Weydemeyer Papers, box 3, folder 3.
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Figure 26.
UCDC pamphlet, 1957. Winton Weydemeyer Papers, box 3, folder 3.
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Figure 27.
Members of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes at the Arlee Community Center.
Jerome Hewankorn and Walter Morigeau are the first two from the left in the front row. 1978.
Char-Koosta 8, no. 13, November 1978.
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Figure 28.
A view of McDonald Peak in what in 1982 became the Mission Mountains Tribal Wilderness.
1949. Rollin H. McKay Photographs, University of Montana.
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Figure 29
The Flathead River at Knowles, Photo by the author, March 2022.
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